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Rights and Contractual Restrictions:
Implications for Implementation of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996
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Incumbent local exchange carrier compliance with 47 U.S.C.
§ 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Telecom Act) requires an incumbent to directly or indirectly provide a competing
local exchange carrier access to and use, or the benefit of the incumbent's use, of computer programs and electronic information
utilized in providing local services. The author considers the law
and policy dimensions of two resulting concerns. The first is that
providing requested access to unbundled network elements, interconnection, or sale of services may infringe intellectual property
rights of third party patent, copyright, trade secret or other intellectual property licensors. The second is that doing so may breach
contract terms that restrict its use or transfer of use-licensed computer program or database copies. The author evaluates these concerns in terms of intellectual property and contract law, including
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).
The concluding section of the paper considers the presentation of
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these issues as matters to be addressed in the implementation of
47 U.S.C. § 251.
Contractual regulation of the use of and access to computer
programs and digitally stored information has an importance to
the telecommunications industry that generally is overlooked.
Scholarly and popular literature tend to deal with the subject
either in broad terms or with a focus on commercially distributed
computer programs and information products, and standard form
shrink-wrap and click-wrap software and information product
licenses in particular. While this literature is highly relevant to
telecommunications industry members' entry into the on-line service and content provider markets, it does not address issues that
have arisen concerning implementation of the local competition
provisions of the Telecom Act.
This paper addresses contract and related intellectual property issues presented by the Petition of MCI for Declaratory Ruling,' recently addressed by the Fourth Circuit in AT&T
Communications of Virginia, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic-Virginia, Inc.2,
and suggested by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in DSC
Communications,Corp. v. Pulse Communications,Inc. 3 MCI's petition and AT&T v. Bell Atlantic challenge incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC) refusals to make unbundled network
elements available to a competing local exchange carrier (CLEC)
on the ground that doing so may infringe third parties' intellectual
property rights in network element technologies. DSC v. Pulse
deals in a quite different context with some of what underlies the
challenged ILEC position. It addresses, in part, whether the rights
acquired by a lawful user of a copy of a copyrighted computer program differ as a matter of federal copyright law depending on
whether the contract under which possession and use was acquired
is characterized as a license or a sale. 4 The court's answer and
reasoning bear upon, but are not wholly dispositive with respect to,
the intellectual property law issue framed by the MCI petition.
Like the MCI petition and AT&T v. Bell Atlantic, it is less instruc1. In re Petition of MCI for Declaratory Ruling (Mar. 11, 1997) (CC Docket
No. 96-98, File No. CCBPOL 97-4).
2. 197 F.3d 663 (4th Cir. 1999).
3. 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
4. The relevance of the case depends little on the fortuity that it concerned
teleconnunication digital switch technology.
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tive with respect to the not usually distinguished question of
whether an ILEC would be legally justified in refusing to make unbundled network elements available, or to interconnect or sell
services for purposes of resale, on the ground that this would violate a contractual use or transfer restriction rather than infringe
third parties' intellectual property rights.
The latter question, gained new importance in July 1999. It
was then that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (ULC) voted final approval of the UCITA as a new
uniform state law. This measure, which was introduced as proposed new legislation in some states as early as September 1999,
includes state contract law rules which validate contract terms
that restrict the use and prohibit the transfer of computer program
and electronic information copies. Even if not widely enacted,
UCITA may have wide impact by virtue of the fact that it expressly
gives effect to contractual choice of law. This paper therefore provides an introduction to key features of UCITA, and makes the
uniform act its focus in discussing the ILEC claim that the terms of
existing license agreements with their suppliers precludes CLEC
interconnection, unbundled network element access, and purchase
of retail services for purposes of resale.
Finally, the paper assesses the merits of and potential responses to the proposition that third party intellectual property or
contract rights constrain ILEC compliance with 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(c). Consideration is given to the AT&T v. Bell Atlantic decision
published by the Fourth Circuit just prior to this article's publication. It becomes more apparent in this part why it is important to
differentiate property from contract rights, and to similarly think
critically at other steps so as to refine both legal issues and policy
choices.
I.
A.

REGULATORY CONTEXT

TelecommunicationsAct of 1996

The aim of the Telecom Act is to reduce regulation and promote competition in the provision of telecommunications services.
Toward this end, Congress obliged all telecommunications carriers
to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other carriers, and not to install network features, functions or capabilities that do not comply with guidelines and

162 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:159
standards established by the Commission for interconnectivity
coordination. 5
Congress generally mandated that ILEC's facilitate, not impede, CLEC entry into local telecommunications services markets,
and required ILECs to negotiate agreements with requesting telecommunications carriers for network interconnection and for access to unbundled local network elements on terms that are just,
reasonable and nondiscriminatory. 6 This was accompanied by
prohibiting the ILEC provision of long distance telecommunications services without obtaining Commission approval. 7 Gaining
that permission requires an ILEC to meet two tests. The first is
that it has entered into an approved binding agreement to provide
an unaffiliated CLEC with access and interconnection to local exchange network facilities." The second is to satisfy the Commission that the provided access and interconnection terms meet the
requirements set forth in the multi-point "Competitive Checklist"
of 47 U.S.C. § 271(c). 9
Like the legislative process leading to enactment of the statute, the implementation process has been strongly contested. The
Commission's First Order and Report on implementation of the local competition and interconnection provisions of the 1996 Act
made clear that strong differences of view existed with respect to
both approach and particulars. Potential local market entrants
generally favored explicit national standards; incumbents and
state commissions that traditionally regulated them urged general
regulations or guidelines administered by state commissions.
When the Commission opted for adopting national standards, the
contest was carried into the courts.
State commissions and ILECs challenged the rulemaking in
several federal courts, primarily asserting the invalidity of several
local competition provisions for the reason that they pertained to
interstate matters which are subject to state, not Commission, jurisdiction and rulemaking authority. The various actions were
consolidated in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision of
which substantially upheld the challenges on the ground that the
5. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (Supp. 1I 1997).
6. See id. at § 251(c).
7. See id. at § 271(a).

8. See id. at § 271(cX1XA).
9. See id. at § 271(c)(2).
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Commission's general rulemaking power extends only to interstate
matters, and that the 1996 Act did not expressly grant new authority to make rules governing interstate telecommunications. 10 A divided Supreme Court in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board"
reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding that the Commission's general rulemaking authority includes authority to carry out the local
competition amendments to the Telecommunications Act of 1934.12

Implementation of 47 U.S.C. § 251 through agreement negotiation and unresolved issue arbitration pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252
likewise has been slow and contentious. ILECs tend to view
CLECs as seeking to secure too much for too little, or seeking to
obtain unfair advantage by selecting beneficial and shunning more
heavily cost-burdened network, interconnection and service elements under the pick-and-choose rule' 3 governing CLEC access to
unbundled network elements. CLECs, on the other hand, tend to
view ILECs as resisting competing local exchange carrier market
entry or strategically using the combination of term negotiation
and state commission contested term arbitration to secure ILECfavoring agreements and establish entry-stalling of burdening conditions. Dissatisfaction with the results of state commission arbitration has been the basis for numerous actions in U.S. District
Courts pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6), including AT&T v. Bell
Atlantic. Within the local competition context, the specific matter
discussed below tends to be viewed--depending on one's vantage
point-either as one in which CLECs seek too much for too little,
or one in which ILECs seek to delay and burden CLEC market entry. Meanwhile one game ball in this contest is third parties' intellectual property and related rights, discussed in Part II of this
paper.

10. See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 795-96, 800-02, 805-06 (8th Cir.
1997), afrd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded sub nom., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa

Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
11. 525 U.S. 366, 376-87 (1999).
12. The Court did affirm the Eighth Circuit's adverse determination with respect to one application of the 1996 Act by the Commission, and the Commission
has initiated a proposed rulemaking to address this matter.
13. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.809 (1998).
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B.

MCI Petition for DeclaratoryRuling Under 47 U.S.C.
§§ 251 and 253

MCI Telecommunications Corp. (MCI) petitioned the Commission for a declaratory ruling that "incumbent local exchange carriers

.

.

.

cannot refuse

to

provide

'just, reasonable,

and

nondiscriminatory access' to unbundled network elements under
the guise of protecting the intellectual property rights of third parties." 14 MCI alleged that at least one ILEC insists that a CLEC
secure a separate license or other right-to-use agreement from the
manufacturer or other provider of each ILEC network element to
which it requests access. Southwestern Bell, according to the petition, included these terms in its filed Statement of Generally Available Terms, and identified agreement to them as an issue in the
negotiation and arbitration of agreements pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(1)(a). In an arbitration award made prior to MCI's filing, the
Texas Public Utility Commission adopted the Southwestern Bell
position subject to two modifications.' 5 The first required Southwestern Bell to supply upon request a list of all known and necessary license and right-to-use agreements, while the second
required that Southwestern use best efforts to facilitate CLEC acquisition of necessary authorizations. The term created mutual indemnification obligations for losses or expenses arising from any
third party claim of infringement. Still, the effect of adopting the
principal Southwestern Bell position made this primarily a CLEC
obligation to indemnify Southwestern for any losses or claims resulting from the competing carrier's failure to obtain a sufficient
authorization, or engaging in conduct exceeding the scope of obtained authorization.
The issue has arisen in several other states, always in the context of state commission arbitration of unresolved issues and, most
recently, federal judicial review of the Virginia State Corporation
Commission in AT&T v. Bell Atlantic. More recent arbitration decisions in Arkansas and Montana squarely rejected the ILEC-preferred position, reasoning that the securing of any necessary
14. In re Petition of MCI for Declaratory Ruling (Mar. 11, 1997) (CC Docket
No. 96-98, File No. CCBPOL 97-4).
15. See In re MFS Communications Co., Inc. Arbitration Award, Tex. Pub.
Util. Comm'n, Docket Nos. 16189, 16196 & 16226, slip op. at 96 (Nov. 7, 1996);
Petition of AT&T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., Mont. Pub. Servs.
Comni'n, Util. Div., Docket No. D96.11.200, Order No. 5961d (Apr. 30, 1998).
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permissions is part of an ILEC's statutory obligation to provide interconnection and access to unbundled network elements.1 6 The
Ohio Public Utilities Commission reached a like conclusion and
further determined that Cincinnati Bell should pay any additional
fees which providing access to unbundled network elements required, the recovery of this cost to be through nondiscriminatory
rates based on forward looking costs.' 7 Somewhat differently, the

Ohio Commission determined that, with respect to interconnection, 47 U.S.C. § 251 requires each carrier to secure any necessary
permissions from their own equipment and software providers, but
that the CLEC must agree to assume responsibility with respect to
future usage under a license upon Cincinnati Bell providing notice
that a third party may require an additional license or license
fee.' AT&T v. Bell Atlantic held, solely with respect to third party
intellectual property rights, that Bell Atlantic must use best efforts
to renegotiate existing intellectual property licenses as necessary.' 9 The court stopped short of establishing a duty to provide
licensing terms identical to those in existing ILEC and equipment
provider agreements, establishing only a best effort duty to
20
negotiate.
The second Ohio decision serves as a reminder that, while the
MCI petition focuses on access to unbundled network elements,
other interconnection or resale of services also may be implicated.
In fact, the provision in Southwestern Bell's Statement of Generally Available Terms quoted in MCI's petition expressly extends to
agreements for interconnection and sale of services as well as those
for access to unbundled network elements. Possible differences in
the implications of various types of arrangements envisioned by
the Telecom Act led the Commission, when soliciting comments on
the issues presented by the MCI petition and another matter, 2 1 to
16. See In re AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc., Arbitration
Award, Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Docket No. 96-395-U, Order No. 5, slip op. at

4

(Feb. 28, 1997).
17. See In re MCI Telecomms. Corp., Case No. 97-152-TP-ARB (May 14, 1997).
18. See In re Petition of ICG Telecom Group, Inc., Arbitration Award, Pub.
Util. Comm'n of Ohio, Case No. 97-92-TP-ARB, 1997 Ohio PUC LEXIS 753 (Oct. 2,
1997).

19. AT&T Communications of Va., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic-Va., 197 F.3d 663, 67071 (4th Cir. 1999).
20. See id.
21. Petition of Local Exchange Carrier Coalition for Reconsideration and Clarification of First Report and in the Implementation of the Local Competition Provi-
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frame its questions to gain input specific to access to unbundled
network elements and the sale of services. Specifically, it asked:
(1) Does providing access to unbundled network elements implicate the intellectual property rights of equipment vendors or other third parties? Why or why not?
(2) Does providing access to network elements other than access to vertical features of unbundled switches implicate
intellectual property rights of equipment vendors or other
third parties? Why or why not?
(3) Does providing access to services for resale, in accordance
with section 251, implicate intellectual property rights of
equipment vendors or other third parties? Why or why
not?
(4) What are the potential burdens on requesting telecommunications carriers if they are required to independently negotiate licensing agreements with equipment vendors or
other parties before obtaining access to unbundled network elements? Are there ways to eliminate or reduce
those burdens on requesting telecommunications
22
carriers?
The Commission further invited comment on "MCI's proposal
that incumbent LECs bear the burden of negotiating any extension
or augmentation of intellectual property rights that might be implicated in interconnection agreements." 23 Some, though far from
all, of these questions were addressed in AT&T v. Bell Atlantic.
II.

A.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CONTRACT LAw CONTEXT

Introductory Observations

Property and contract rights are quite different. The former
are exclusive in character and good against the world. The latter
are transactional and effective primarily between only parties to
an agreement. The former are the subject matter of transactions.
The latter express the terms of those deals, including those which
describe what rights or interests in property are being exchanged
sions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Sept. 30, 1996) (CC Docket No. 9698).
22. Petition of MCI for Declaratory Ruling that New Entrants Need not Obtain Separate License or Right-to-Use Agreements Before Purchasing Unbundled
Elements, 62 Fed. Reg. 13852 (Mar. 24, 1997).
23. Id.
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for a stated price, other property or services, or the promise of
some other act or forbearance. Even so, the distinction often is lost
or hidden where the word "license" is indiscriminately used to describe an interest in or privilege to use property and to label or
characterize the agreement that conveys that interest or grants
that privilege. This is common, and indeed the foundation upon
which the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
rests.2 4 The conflation is manifested in a Southwestern Bell Statement of Generally Available Terms 25 provision which speaks of
"patent, copyright and trade secret rights... and contract rights of
third parties" as not being transferred to a competing carrier by
Southwestern Bell entering into an agreement pursuant to 47
U.S.C. § 251.26 It also is evidenced in comments 2 7 and legal expert
affidavits 28 filed in the MCI matter, and even in the Commission's
notice soliciting those comments. 29 This tendency magnifies the
difficulty of the issues presented to the Commission, and unduly
complicates the Commission's shaping of whatever general course
of action it chooses.
The subject matter introduced in the two following sections
play back the interaction of intellectual property and contract in
24.

See, e.g., David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Ex-

pand, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 17 (1999); David A. Rice, DigitalInformation As Property and
Product: U.C.C. Article 2B, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 621 (1997).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 252(f) of the Telecom Act provides for Bell operating company
filing with a state commission of "a statement of the terms and conditions that
such company generally offers within that State to comply with the requirements
of Section 251 ... and the regulations thereunder and the standards applicable

under this section." 47 U.S.C. § 252(f) (Supp. III 1997). Subsection (f) characterizes such a filing as a Statement of Generally Available Terms, generally known as
SGATS.
26. The provision is quoted in In re Petition of MCI for Declaratory Ruling at 5
n.1 (Mar. 11, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPOL 97-4).
27. See Lucent Techs., Inc., Comments at 5, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory
Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); Lucent
Techs., Inc., Reply Comments at 6-7, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling

(May 6, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); Northern Telecom,
Inc., Comments at 1, 6, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997)

(CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
28. Compare Affidavit of Roger M. Milgrim at 14, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 14, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4) (attachment to Comments submitted by SBC Communications) (tends to not
differentiate), with Affidavit of Richard L. Bernacchi at 14, In re MCI Petition for
Declaratory Ruling (May 5, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4)
(attachment to Comments submitted by AT&T) (tends to differentiate).
29. See supra note 21.
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quite different ways. Indeed, it is not necessarily obvious from the
immediately following synopsis of the DSC v. Pulse litigation how
and why the case reflects this. Its importance, as a paradigm as
much as a judicial decision, is made quite apparent at a later point.
In contrast, the "how and in what ways" is immediately obvious
from the post-DSC v. Pulse discussion of the proposed Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act.
B. DSC Communications v. Pulse Communications
DSC v. Pulse tangentially bears upon the immediate issues.
This is a product of its focus on the telecommunications equipment
providers' risk exposure of providers' technology through third
party access to their proprietary technology. The case involved a
computer program used in digital loop carrier systems ("DLCs"),
devices used to combine multiple analog telephone signals carried
by traditional copper wires into a single high capacity digital fiber
optic cable transmission. Functionally, use of a DLC obviates the
need for a continuous copper wire connection between each subscriber's telephone and its LEC's central office. Copper wire connection is required only from each local subscriber to a DLC that
serves the subscriber's locality.
The case involved DSC's Litespan 2000, a DLC unit connecting five hundred backplane interface slots with a single
microprocessor, and DSC interface cards that plug into the slots.
The Litespan 2000 design, including its software, accepts incompatible analog signaling protocol interface card--e.g., plain old telephone service (POTS) and private branch exchange (PBX). The
DLC converts these differing analog signals into digital signals
that travel over high-bandwidth channels to the central exchange,
and converts digital signals received from the central exchange
into the voice-frequency analog signal required by a service subscriber. DSC v. Pulse dealt only with matters related to DSC's
POTS-DI (POTS-download image) interface cards and software.
The interface cards each contain microprocessors and interface
circuits. When a card is powered up, it downloads from the Litespan 2000 and temporarily stores in volatile memory a copy of the
POTS-DI software necessary for signal conversion. This software
and other DLC system software reside on the Litespan 2000. The
DLC unit is easily, and principally, updated by changing the Litespan 2000 system, POTS-DI, and other card-downloadable software
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rather than changing interface cards or other hardware components. This is not exclusive, however. A fact significant to DSC's
trade secret claim was that, in one instance, interface card compatibility with DSC's updated POTS-DI software depended on DSC
software ascertaining from the interface card boot code that the
30
card would work properly with the latest software version.
The litigation resulted from Pulse manufacturing and marketing a POTS interface card that was compatible with DSC's Litespan 2000, and thus capable of utilizing DSC's Litespan-resident
POTS-DI software and its updates. DSC sued Pulse, alleging in
relevant part (1) contributory infringement of DSC's copyright in
its software; (2) direct infringement of DSC's copyright in its
software; and (3) misappropriation of DSC's trade secrets.3 ' DSC's
central argument was that, by causing DSC's software to download
onto its interface cards, Pulse infringed DSC's copyright in the
software and also contributed to copyright infringement by Litespan 2000 users each time they used a Pulse interface card to
download a copy of DSC's software. The trial court granted judgment for Pulse and dismissed DSC's claims on the ground that
DSC failed to establish a prima facie case of direct infringement by
Pulse or another, so that Pulse could not be found liable for either
direct infringement or contribution to infringement by Litespan
2000 users.
The Court of Appeals noted that the infringement claim
hinged upon an interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 117 of the Copyright
Act.32 It provides that "[It is not an infringement for the owner of

a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that program provided: ... that such

a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and
that it is used in no other manner."33 DSC claimed on appeal that,
under the purchase transactions between DSC and its RBOC customers, the RBOCs were software copy licensees rather than owners. The court agreed that the trial court erred in deciding that the
RBOCs were, as a matter of law, "owners" entitled to make a copy
30. See DSC Communications, Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d
1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 286 (1999).
31. See id. at 1357.
32. See id. at 1359.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994) (emphasis added).

170 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:159
34
for certain purposes under 17 U.S.C. § 117 of the Copyright Act.
In doing so, the court noted that original draft language of 17
U.S.C. §35117 contained the term "rightful possessor" instead of
"owner," and concluded that change to "owner" in the enacted 17
U.S.C. § 117 shows "that Congress must have meant to require
more than 'rightful possession' to trigger the 17 U.S.C. § 117 defense."36 The court also took notice of MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc.,37 in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Peak was not an owner of software for purposes of 17 U.S.C.
§ 117 because Peak had licensed the software from MAI.3 8 The
court did not entirely accept the holding of the MAI court that all
licensees are non-owners, but noted that a license could so restrict
the ownership rights of a licensee that they would not be owners
for the purpose of 17 U.S.C. § 117.39 The court determined that
the licensing agreements between the RBOCs and DSC made it
clear that "DSC did not intend to convey any ownership rights in
its copyright as part of the licensing agreements with the
RBOCs." 40 What followed was a rejection of the trial court's reasoning that, because the RBOCs received their interest in the
software through a lump sum payment and for an unlimited time,
they were owners for the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 117.4 1 The court
held instead that, while the length of the right to possession and
the type of payment are relevant to the analysis, they are not dispositive with respect to what the court characterized as the com42
plex question of ownership.
The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that it "was improper
for the [trial] court to conclude as a matter of law, that the RBOCs
were 'owners' under 17 U.S.C. § 117 of the copies of DSC's software
that were in their possession."4 3 It therefore remanded DSC's direct and contributory infringement claims to the District Court for
further proceedings. In contrast, it upheld the dismissal of DSC's

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See DSC, 170 F.3d at 1360.
Id.
Id.
991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
See DSC, 170 F.3d at 1360.
See id.
Id. at 1361.
See id. at 1362.
See id.
Id.
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copyright infringement claims specific to Litespan 2000 systems
that Pulsecom had purchased from a third party, concluding that
Pulse was entitled under 17 U.S.C. § 117 to make copies of the
Litespan 2000 software because the purchased systems were not
subject to any licensing agreement restrictions. 44 Finally, it reversed the dismissal of DSC's state trade secret law claim under
which DSC alleged that information disclosed to Pulse by DSC customers was a trade secret, and that the disclosure was obtained by
improper means, 4 5 and also the dismissal of Pulse's claim that
46
DSC had infringed a Pulse patent.
C. AT&T v. Bell Atlantic

In December 1999, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt
with an AT&T and MCI challenge to Virginia State Corporation
Commission approval of an interconnection agreement on the
ground that it did not meet the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 251.
Among the claims raised by MCI was that the third party intellectual property rights term fixed by state commission arbitration
created a disparity between Bell Atlantic and CLEC access to local
network element hardware and software used by Bell Atlantic
under third party vendor licenses. 4 7 Specifically, MCI had argued
before the state commission that Bell Atlantic must be required to
renegotiate existing and negotiate future license agreements to
provide for MCI use of any network hardware or software used by
Bell Atlantic. The argument was rejected in favor of requiring Bell
Atlantic to: (1) indemnify MCI against any third party intellectual
property claims arising from its use of any later-acquired network
hardware and software; (2) notify MCI of any threatened or pending intellectual property claims; and, (3) accord MCI the benefits of
any intellectual property claim indemnities given to Bell Atlantic
by its vendors to the extent that the terms of those indemnities
permitted. The District Court rejected MCI's claim that the prescribed terms discriminated against MCI in violation of 47 U.S.C.
44. See id. at 1363. It is unclear what result the court would have reached if it
had been shown that Pulse's transferor originally had acquired the Litespan 2000
unit and its software from DSC subject to a contractual term prohibiting further
sale or other transfer of the software or the Litespan 2000.
45. See id. at 1364.
46. See id. at 1367-68.
47. See AT&T Communications of Va., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic-Va., 197 F.3d 663,
670 (4th Cir. 1999).
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§ 251(c)(3). The Court of Appeals reversed, and remanded to the
District Court with direction that it require the Virginia State Corporation Commission to conduct further proceedings to assure that
Bell Atlantic "must use its best efforts to renegotiate its intellectual property licenses on network hardware and software to allow
use by MCI."48 It made clear that it did interpret the Telecom Act

to require that Bell Atlantic actually renegotiate is existing license
agreements, and left undisturbed those provisions of the Virginia
State Corporation Commission order concerning licenses entered
into by Bell Atlantic in the future. Specific to existing agreements,
the court stated:
We recognize that negotiations might not be successful in
every instance. If negotiations fail, we do not interpret
§ 251(c)(3) to impose an absolute duty to provide identical licensing terms in the case of existing agreements ....

Still,

there must be a duty to negotiate. Otherwise the Act's goal49
competition in local telephone markets-would be ignored.
It supported this by analogizing to Federal Communication Commission recognition in its First Report and Order that there might
be "rare circumstances where it is technically infeasible for an incumbent LEC to provision access or elements that are equal-inquality."5 0 With that, it reversed the lower court's dismissal of
MCI's claim, directed it to enter summary judgment for MCI, grant
MCI the relief specified by the Court of Appeals, and remand the
issue to the Virginia State Corporation Commission. 5 1
The disposition is striking on two counts. The first is analogizing bargaining failure to technological infeasibility. The latter imposes brittle constraints. The essence of the former is, in contrast,
its flexibility. Second, it leaves unanswered the practical, financial, competitive, and Telecom Act policy implementation consequences of Bell Atlantic lack of success in negotiations. Among
those which the court itself had identified in the paragraph immediately preceding the presentation of its disposition were that: (1)
MCI use risked third party suit for infringement; (2) only Bell Atlantic had the information necessary to ascertain and assess this
48. Id.
49. Id. at 671.
50. Id. (quoting In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, at $ 313 (Aug. 8, 1996) (CC Docket No. 96-

98)).
51. See id.
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risk; (3) MCI might have to limit its ability to compete by restricting itself to using only certain Bell Atlantic network hardware and
software; and, (4) MCI might be required to incur greater costs in
the provision of identical services as a result of having to indepen52
dently negotiate use rights in exchange for additional fees.
These are precisely the consequences which led MCI to file its petition with the Federal Communications Commission and to challenge in federal court the decision of the Virginia State
Corporation Commission.
D.

UCITA: ProposedState ContractLaw of Computer
Information Use Licensing

The courts to date consistently have applied Uniform Commercial Code sale of goods law in resolving computer software contract disputes. 53 Exceptions are extraordinarily rare, and consist
primarily of cases in which the performance of services in the creation of a program to meet customer specifications was the principal
object of the transaction. 54 Application of U.C.C. Article 2: Sales
has been the norm even in hybrid transactions where the contracted performance is the design, creation, delivery and installation of an integrated hardware and software system. 55
Difficulties encountered by the courts have been greatest when
the issue for determination has had both contract and intellectual
property law dimensions. This is not unprecedented, especially in
patent 5 6 and trade secret matters. 57 It became a frequent occur52. See id. at 670-71.
53. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying
Illinois and South Dakota law); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.
1996) (applying Wisconsin law); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology,
939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania and Georgia law); RRX Indus.,
Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying California law); M.A.
Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803, 807 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999) (applying Washington law and citing cases).
54. See Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986), affd on rehearing, 493 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986);
Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
55. See BMC Indus., Inc. v. Barth Indus., Inc., 160 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1998);
Sierra Diesel Injection Serv., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 874 F.2d, 653 (9th Cir.
1989), amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g on en bane, 890 F.2d 108 (9th Cir.
1989); USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. App. Ct.
1989); Dreier Co. v. Unitronix Corp., 527 A.2d 875 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
56. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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rence in copyright-related matters following general adoption of
the practice of licensing computer program copy use as distinct
from licensing rights comprised in the copyright of the copied original work. Through these cases there arose the seeming anomaly of
courts generally applying sales contract law which governs transactions for the transfer of title from a seller to a buyer5s while enforcing contractual use restrictions rooted in the formalism of
licensor reservation of title to a copy as the legal means for regulating its use. 5 9 The consequence was presentation to the courts of
such issues as whether a person who acquired a copy under a use
license to which courts generally applied state sales contract law
became the "owner" of that copy for purposes of the Copyright Act
first sale doctrine 6° or a copy "owner" entitled to the benefit of
Copyright Act authorization of certain uses of a computer program
6
that otherwise would constitute infringement of its copyright. '
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
62
(UCITA), formerly draft Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B,
responds by rejecting application of U.C.C. Article 2 in favor of creating a comprehensive and complex body of contract law governing
computer information transactions. Despite diverse and often
fierce opposition, 63 UCITA received National Conference of Com57. See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assoc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976).
58. See U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1999) (defining the term "sale").
59. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); National
Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861 (1993).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
61. Id. at § 117.
62. The American Law Institute and the National Conference on Uniform
State Laws agreed in Apr. 1999 that the project draft would not go forward as a
jointly sponsored addition to the Uniform Commercial Code. The Uniform Law
Commissioners then decided to move forward and present the draft for final ap-

proval by the Conference in July 1999 as a National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws uniform law (NCCUSL), and restyled the draft as the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. NCCUSL to Promulgate Freestanding Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. The American Law

Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, ALI
and NCCUSL Announce that Legal Rules for Computer Information Will not be
Part of UCC (last modified Apr. 7, 1999) <http:/www.nccusl.org/pressrel/2brel.
html>.

63. UCITA's on-the-record opponents include the Motion Picture Association
of America, National Association of Broadcasters, Consumers Union, Consumer
Federation of America, Society of Information Management, U.S. Public Interest
Research Group, American Library Association, American Association of Law Libraries, Association of Research Libraries, Medical Library Association, Associa-
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missioners on Uniform State Laws (ULC) final approval as a ULC
uniform state law in July 1999. A combination of strong support
from software and electronic database publishers and an unwavering commitment to UCITA on the part of the ULC leadership produced this outcome. UCITA has since been introduced for
enactment as state law in several states identified as ones most
likely to enact UCITA even if it is strongly contested in state capitol hearing rooms and corridors by its longstanding principal
opponents. 64
Contract and its terms are UCITA's subjects. Among its provisions is one which, subject to one limited consumer contract exception, declares that contracting parties may contractually choose or
designate the law governing their transaction. 65 It can be expected
that the law chosen by standard form contract terms and bargained for inclusion in other contracts will be that of a UCITAenacting state. Additionally, agreed scope coordination language
for UCITA and revision of U.C.C. Article 2 would revise the latter
to state "This article applies to transactions in goods, but does not
apply to computer information."" Where a state legislature adds
the provision and its accompanying UCITA-mirroring definition of
"computer information" to the state's U.C.C. Article 2, but does not
tion for Computing Machinery, several software developers groups, software
resellers, and a large number of intellectual property law and commercial contract
law professors. Those expressing strong reservations or concerns include the Federal Trade Commission bureaus, IEEE, Digital Future Coalition, and National Retail Federation.
Those urging that UCITA be tabled for further consideration and brought
back for final action at a future date include at least one-half of the Attorneys
General of the several states and the American Committee on Interoperable Systems. See Padraic Cassidy, Attorneys General Object to Law Regulating Online
Transactions,New Jersey L.J. (Dec. 21, 1999) (visited Jan. 2, 2000) <http:I/www.
njlawjournal.com>.
64. The earliest introductions, or at least the earliest state legislative hearings, appear to have been in Oklahoma and Virginia, the former being the home
state of the Executive director of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Professor Frederick H. Miller, and the latter the home state
of the Chair of the UCITA Drafting Committee, Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. See also Carol
A. Kunze, A Guide to the Proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act (last modified Dec. 14, 1999) <http://www.2bguide.com> (following ongoing
state legislative actions regarding UCITA).
65. See UCITA § 109(a) (1999).
66. Memorandum from the Chairpersons and Reporters of the U.C.C. Article 2
and UCITA Drafting Committees to Members of the U.C.C. Article 2 and UCITA
Drafting Committees (June 29, 1999) (visited Nov. 22, 1999) <1/http-1/www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2103mfm.htm>.
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enact UCITA, the effect will be to override case law that directly
applies U.C.C. Article 2. Courts will be left to choose between applying it by analogy, applying general contract law, or looking to
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL)-approved UCITA for guidance. The latter is jurisprudentially unsound, 67 but this does not make UCITA influence altogether improbable.
Legislating the enforceability of contractual restrictions on the
use and transfer of computer program and information copies as a
matter of state law is a principal aim of UCITA. Its scope of application is broad, and extendable by agreement to cover mixed transactions in which the subject matter includes both equipment and
computer information. With respect to scope, it broadly defines
"computer information" to include software, inclusive of a computer program and its informational content, 68 and "information in
electronic form that is obtained from or through the use of a computer."6 9 Clearly included are a telecommunication switch computer program, informational content of the program, and the
contents of ILECs' customer and other databases in electronic
form. Concerning the latter, validation of information content access and use restrictions builds upon the use licensing model popularized by software publishers as a means for creating database
protection through contract. This is, of course, an antidote for judicial determination that information compilations that do not meet
the originality criterion qualify for even the limited, or "thin," copyright protection given to factual works. 70 Equally, this contract-

67. Existing law of the state clearly is more authoritative than a proposed new
uniform legislation which the state's legislature has not enacted. Although direct
application of U.C.C. Article 2 would be excluded, a court still might draw upon its
principles where particularly relevant to the task of fitting a state's general contract law to computer information transactions.
68. See UCITA § 102(a)(64) (1999). "Computer program" is separately defined
in terms that echo the Copyright Act definition of that term: "... . a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about
a certain result." Id. at § 102(aX13).
69. Id. at § 102(a)(11). Hereinafter, "electronic information" is used in this
paper as the equivalent of the statutory language "information in electronic form
that is obtained from or through the use of a computer."
70. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
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based protection answers the frequent lack of information content
eligibility for protection under state trade secret law.7 1
In addition to including far more than computer program copies, UCITA reaches a far broader range of transactions than the
archetypal shrink-wrap, click-wrap, site, and multi-user software
licenses to which it originally was drawn. It covers access agreements 72 and agreement to transfer a copy of or rights in a com-

puter program or its informational content, or a copy of or rights in
electronic information. 73 This includes a sale of a copy or an assignment of informational rights, 74 and the assignment or other
transfer of a contractual interest in computer information. 75 This
is emphasized by defining "license"76 to include the sale of a copy
so long as a contract term restricts use of the copy, its transfer, or
the transfer of contract rights. 77 These intricacies are captured in
71. Among other things, the content must be something that is not generally
known to, and not readily ascertainable by, others who can obtain economic value
from its use or disclosure. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4)(i) (1985).
72. "Access contract" is defined in UCITA § 102(a)(1) but the definition of
"computer information transaction" does not expressly include access contracts.
Their inclusion clearly is intended and was express prior to relatively recent restatement of statutory scope and concomitant introduction of the term "computer
information transaction." Reporter's Note 2c to UCITA § 102 directly states that
contracts for access to information are within UCITA, and this can be statutorily
grounded by tracing terms: the § 102(a)(12) definition of "computer information
transaction" includes a "license" and the § 102(aX42) definition of "license" includes and "access contract" which § 102(a)(1) states is "a contract to obtain electronically access to, or information from, an information processing system of
another.., or the equivalent of such access."
73. UCITA § 102(a)(12) defines "computer information transaction" as "an
agreement and the performance of that agreement to create, modify, transfer, or
license computer information or informational rights in computer information."
74. UCITA § 102(a)(69)(B) defines "transfer" to include, with respect to computer information-as distinguished from contractual rights-"sale or lease of a
copy as well as an assignment of informational rights." There is latent in this a
lesson about the intricacy of, and potential surprises lurking within, UCITA. The
"transfer" definition sweeps into UCITA all contracts for the transfer of rights in
information independent of K, and (43) defines "licensee" as a transferee in a license or other agreement.
75. See UCITA § 102(a)(69)(A) (1999).
76. "License" is generally defined to mean "a contract that authorizes access to
or use of information on express terms that limit contractual rights or authorized
uses, prohibit some uses, or convey less than all information rights, expressly limit
some uses, or expressly, prohibit some uses expire or uses granted, expressly prohibits some uses, or expressly grants less than all rights in the information." Id. at
§ 102(a)(42).
77. The express language which accomplishes this states "A contract may be a
license whether or not the transferee has title to a licensed copy." Id.
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the definition of "licensee"78 and "licensor"79 as a transferee or
transferor, respectively, in "a license or other agreement" governed
by the statute.8 0
The significance of UCITA for telecommunications hardware,
software, database, and services contracts is readily apparent. It
clearly reaches the contracts between ILECs and their equipment
and software providers, the contracts that are at the heart of the
MCI proceeding. In addition, there can be no doubt that ILEC and
CLEC network element access, telecommunication services resale,
and other terms of network interconnection agreements come
within the scope of UCITA. The definition of "access contract" itself reaches all in at least some respects. An agreement between
an ILEC and a CLEC that does not fit the more inclusive definition
of "license"-a contract which authorizes access to or use of information or informational rights subject to some express limitation-is virtually inconceivable.
With respect to mixed transactions, UCITA governs the whole
if the primary subject matter of a transaction is computer information, 8 ' but only with respect to that part of a transaction specific to
computer information if computer information is not the primary
subject matter.8 2 As a matter of preference, or as means of resolving uncertainty as to what constitutes the primary subject matter,
contracting parties my contractually elect that UCITA govern all
aspects of any transaction in which computer information is material part of the subject matter.83 The high incidence of mixed hardware and computer information transactions8 4 in the
telecommunications industry makes this election, or opt-in, provision one of particular significance to its members.
Under UCITA, terms made available after payment, commencement of use or performance, or some other event that most
would consider the point of, if not after, contract formation are en78. Id. at § 102(a)(43).
79. Id. at § 102(a)(44).
80. Parties are therefore referred to throughout UCITA as licensors and licensees except as the context otherwise requires, e.g., transferee, transferor, financier.

81.
82.
83.
84.

See id. at § 103(b)(1).
See id. at § 103(b)(2).
See id. at § 103(e).
"Computer information" is used here as it is defined in UCITA to include

electronic information, not in its more limited meaning of computer program or
software.
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forceable as contract terms.8s This includes a term that elects, or
opts-into, UCITA as the law governing contract formation, interpretation, performance, enforcement, and remedies as well as any
86
term that defines the scope of a computer information license.
The principal exceptions are narrow and can be established only
through later litigation in which a court determines that a particular term is unconscionable, 8 7 contrary to fundamental public policy,88 or induced by fraud.8 9 Although the primary original aim
was to make standard form terms enforceable, the section and its
resurrection of the so-called "last shot" rule applies universally. It
is not generally limited by UCITA's parol evidence rule which sets
forth the traditional exclusion of evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement 9 ° and permits introduction of evidence of
consistent additional terms. 9 1 It is arguable that evidence of postcommitment terms could not be introduced in a case in which a
court determined that a prior record was intended by the parties as
a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of their agreement, 92 but even this is uncertain. 93
85. See UCITA § 210(b) (1999).
86. "Scope" is defined in UCITA § 102(aX61) in terms that echo its usage in
intellectual property law. The definition states:
"Scope", with respect to a license, means terms defining:
(A) the licensed copies, information, or informational rights involved;
(B) the use or access authorized, prohibited, or controlled; and the
duration of the license.
87. See UCITA § 111 (1999); UCITA § 210, Reporter's Note 2 (1999).
88. See UCITA § 105(b) (1999).
89. See UCITA § 210, Reporter's Note 2 (1999), which implicitly references
UCITA § 104(a) and its preservation of the law of fraud as a generally applicable
supplemental principle of law and equity.
90. See UCITA § 301 (1999).
91. See id. at § 301(b).
92. See id.
93. The predicted, and perhaps successful, answer to this is the relevant record is the one to which UCITA § 210(b) expressly refers-the one made available
after payment or commencement of use or performance. The contracting process
antidote is to expressly state in the parties' agreement that the particular record
constitutes a complete and exclusive statement of terms upon which the parties
have agreed, and that it excludes any additional or different terms that are contained in a record made available at a later date unless the term is agreed to by an
authenticated record in accordance with the contract modification rule of UCITA
§ 303(b). This is, of course, the opposite of excluding any evidence of a prior or
contemporaneous agreement, the traditional aim of a merger or integration clause,
and is more akin to a contractual term which requires express written assent to
any modification of originally agreed terms. See U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1995); U.C.C.
§ 2A-208(2) (1995).
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Terms of a contract governed by UCITA are enforceable
against third parties, not just the licensee. This is not self-evident.9 4 The effect is indirectly accomplished by two rules. The
first rejects the good faith purchaser protection that is a cornerstone of sale of goods and general contract law. It declares that a
transferee in a transfer that is otherwise effective under UCITA
takes subject to the original license terms. 95 The second limits the
transferability of a license by making a prohibited transfer not just
a breach, but wholly ineffective as a transfer of rights. Specifically,
section 506(a) provides that a transferee acquires no interest in information, copies, or the contractual or informational rights of the
licensee unless the transfer is one which is made effective under
the rules of section 503 of the statute.96 The intention of the draft
in defining "transfer" so as to exclude an agreement to exercise
rights through a sublicensee or delegate 97 is not entirely clear, but
it would be inconsistent with the thrust of UCITA to consider that
the provision would shelter an agreement under which an ILEC
made a CLEC its sublicensee.
While section 503 generally states that a contractual interest
is transferable, its principal object is to make clear that a contractual interest is not transferable and that any purported transfer is
wholly ineffective in the following cases: a contract term prohibits
transfer; 98 transfer is prohibited by other law;9e transfer would
materially change the duty of the other party; transfer would materially increase the burden or risk imposed on the other party; or
transfer would materially impair the other party's property or its
likelihood or expectation of obtaining return performance. 10 0 In
practice, contractual prohibition or restriction of transfer is common, even in standard form shrinkwrap licenses.' 0 1 In addition,
94. In contrast, early drafts made the point clear. They did so by following the

direct approach of U.C.C. § 9-201, which expressly states that "a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of
the collateral and against creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201 (1995).

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See UCITA § 506(b) (1999).
See id. at § 506(a).
Id. at § 102(a)(69)(A).
See id. at § 503(b).
See id. at § 503(a)(1).
See id. at § 503(aX2).
Notably, a motion to make contractual prohibitions against transfer in

mass market transactions unenforceable was defeated by a narrow margin during

the debate leading up to final approval of UCITA by the National Conference of
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Reporter's Notes to the draft presented to the Uniform Law Commissioners for final approval in July 1999 strongly guide counsel
and courts to conclude that UCITA licenses generally are not
transferable even in the absence of a contractual prohibition. One
intimates that federal copyright and patent law make all UCITA
licenses nontransferable as a matter of law.' 0 2 Another strongly
suggests that trade secret law and policy prohibit licensee transfer
of a copy of computer information that embodies a licensor trade
secret, and preclude transferee acquisition of any right to use the
protected subject matter.10 3
Federal patent and copyright law in fact apply only to licenses
of rights created by federal law, and cognate rules crafted by the
courts in adjudicating disputes arising under those statutes govern
only licenses of those rights. Further, it is well established that
state contract law rules govern the formation, interpretation and
effect of copyright and patent right licenses subject only to two exceptions. The first is where the statute itself establishes a special
rule.' ° 4 The second, as in the cases cited by the Reporter, is where
applying an otherwise applicable rule of state contract law would
undercut or conflict with a substantive policy expressed in or underlying the federal statute.
The cases relied upon by the Reporter expressly state that
they adopt a rule different from state contract law, and acknowledge that this is constitutionally permitted under Erie v.
Tompkins' 0 5 only in special circumstances, and even then subject
to narrow limits.' 0 6 Concerning the particular circumstances, the
Commissioners of State Law at its July 1999 Annual Meeting. "Mass market
transaction" is a limited category consisting of a consumer contract and certain
other, but not all, standard form retail market end-user licenses. Id. at
§ 102(a)(46).
102. See Uniform Law Commission, Draft Comments to Uniform Computer Information TransactionsAct (last modified Oct. 15, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.
edu/library/ulc/ucita/cital0cm.htm>.
103. See UCITA § 503, Reporter's Note 3a (1999).
104. A prominent example is set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) which makes a
signed writing a requisite for valid transfer of copyright ownership. See, e.g., 17
U.S.C. § 204(a) (1988) (making a signed writing a requisite for valid transfer of

copyright ownership).
105. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
106. Patent cases: CFLC, Inc. v. Everex Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 677, 678 (9th Cir.
1996) (citing McCoy v. Mitsoboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995));
Unarco Indus. v. Kelly Co., 465 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 929 (1973); In re Alttech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R. 686, 689 (W.D. Tenn. 1987).
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courts determined that judicial creation of a substantive federal
common law rule was required in order to avoid a conffict between
the otherwise applicable state contract law and the federal law and
its underlying policy expressed in the patent and copyright statutes. 10 7 Concerning scope of application, the leading decisions emphasize that the Erie doctrine dictates that the federal common
law rule supersedes state contract law only to the extent necessary
to resolve the identified conflict.10 8 The twin points strictly limit
the prescriptive or preemptive effect of Everex and like decisions.
It is UCITA alone, not federal law, that changes state law governing most transactions within UCITA's scope.
The design of the Reporter and observers who strongly supported UCITA's covert rejection of freedom to alienate property
and contract rights, one of the basic tenets of modern commercial
contract and competition law, has significant consequences. Sticking solely to UCITA rejection of this tenet is inconsistent with a
fundamental UCITA rule which otherwise makes Everex inapplicable to the vast majority of UCITA transactions.' 0 9 Moreover, not
every contract that expressly transfers informational rights in
computer information meets the criteria for application of the federal common law rule. Everex has no direct application to contracts involving transfer of informational rights created by state
law, and the constitutional effect of Erie is to liberate transfer of
informational rights created by state law from the dictate of
Everex's limited federal common law departure from otherwise
governing state contract law.
The general significance is to reserve substantial licensor control over further, or downstream, transfer of copies. Under UCITA,
for example, Pulse Communications would have acquired no posCopyright cases: In re Patient Education Media, 210 B.R. 237, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(citing Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621,631 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1240 (1996)).
107. See Everex, 89 F.3d at 679.
108. See id. at 678-79 (criticizing opinion in Unarco Indus. v. Kelly Co., 465
F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973), for not taking care to
make clear that application of a federal common law rule is limited, and that state
contract law otherwise governs construction of patent licenses).
109. UCITA § 501(b) states that transfer of a copy does not convey to a licensee
the ownership of informational rights, and UCITA defines "informational rights" to
include those created by federal patent and copyright law. Everex therefore is irrelevant unless a copy license contains an express, or necessarily implied, grant of
informational right created by patent or copyright law.
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sessory or use rights in the software it acquired from a third party
that was subject to a contractual prohibition against transfer. Use
by Pulse therefore would have been unauthorized, and any copy
made in the course of use would infringe DSC's copyright. More
specifically, UCITA rejection of the principle of free alienability is
elsewhere expressed in its rule that contractual use restrictions
are enforceable against third as well as between immediate parties. 1 10 Under this rule, use restrictions in contracts between
ILECs and telecommunication equipment manufacturers' would be
enforceable against CLECs. In general, this is of no moment in
terms of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. It becomes so, however, if any existing or future contractual use restrictions are susceptible of an interpretation that excludes use of an equipment
manufacturer's computer information in a manner necessary to
provide a CLEC with interconnection, access to and use of unbundled network elements, or local exchange services for purposes of
resale. The Virginia State Corporation Commission order at issue
in AT&T v. Bell Atlantic defends against problems being created
by right-to-use restrictions in future ILEC contracts by requiring
Bell Atlantic to indemnify against third party intellectual property
claims arising from any CLEC use of network equipment or
software acquired by Bell Atlantic in the future.' 1 ' The term nevertheless is limited to intellectual property claims, and does not
appear to reach related but purely contractual restriction-of-use
claims.
With respect to trade secret law, the Drafting Committee's November 1998 vote reflected agreement that liability for trade secret
disclosure and the third party effect the transfer of a copy of computer information that embodies a trade secret should continue to
be governed by state trade secret law, not UCITA. The author
elsewhere has shown that, in reality, the rejected rule indirectly
amended the Uniform Trade Secrets Act-one of the Uniform Law
Commissioners' most widely adopted uniform laws-both as to licensee-transferor liability and rights acquired by an innocent

110. See UCITA §§ 504 (b)(1), 506 (a) (1999).
111. AT&T Communications of Va., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic-Va., 197 F.3d 663, 670
(4th Cir. 1999).
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transferee. 1 12 Not unlike what previously happened after the
Drafting Committee affirmatively rejected a draft rule making all
nonexclusive copy use licenses nontransferable, the voted-out
trade secret nontransferability rule was reinserted in different
guise. In this instance, the Reporter inserted a short and bland
new phrase into some standard but dense text borrowed from
U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A, 11 3 kept the prior Reporter's Note general
reference to those U.C.C. articles as the uniform law source, andas unflagged as the change in text-created a new Reporter's Note
to misinstruct judges and lawyers that trade secret law generally
makes transfers of computer information copies and rights unlaw4
ful and wholly ineffective."
The significance in the immediate context includes that it
could be argued on the DSC v. Pulse facts that Pulse acquired no
rights in the equipment and software that it acquired from a third
party because it embodied DSC trade secrets. 1 5 Secondarily, the
slipped-in provision and Official Comment lend an aura of credibility to the ILEC position even though, as explained below, neither
sale of services nor provision of access to unbundled network elements entails disclosure of equipment manufacturers' trade
secrets or breaches confidentiality.
Contractual use restrictions present perhaps the most significant question. Although none detailed in the Milgrim analysis or
identified in ILEC comments appear to impair the right to provide
access to and use of unbundled network elements, it is important
to note that the Milgrim analysis primarily focused on terms specific to intellectual property rights. Similarly, interconnection
agreement terms set by state commission arbitration specifically
deal only with equipment manufacturers' intellectual property
rights. 1 6 Noting this underscores the previously identified difference between property and contract rights. It is the latter that fea112. See David A. Rice, License with Contract and Precedent: Publisher-Licensor Protection Consequences and the Rationale Offered for the Nontransferabilityof
Licenses UnderArticle 2B, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1239, 1248-51 (1998).
113. UCITA § 503(a)(2) (1999).
114. See UCITA § 503, Reporter's Note 3a (1999).
115. It is to be recalled that the primary purpose for which Pulse acquired the
Litespan 2000 was to reverse engineer the unit, and its computer program, in order to ascertain how to make POTS-DI interface cards that would work with the
Litespan 2000 computer program.
116. See, e.g., AT&T, 197 F.3d at 670.
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tured most prominently, but were not specifically described, in
equipment manufacturers' filed comments.
III.

SYNoPsIs OF COMmENTS AND POSITIONS ON MCI PETITION

A. Range of Views
Equipment providers' Comments express support for the
Telecom Act and the Commission objective of promoting competition, and specifically making competition rather than monopoly
the norm in the local telecommunications services market. 117 Simultaneously, they strongly assert the importance of their rights
under patent, copyright and trade secret law, and of their contractual regulation of telecommunications equipment use."1s They admonish that the Commission lacks legal authority to compromise
those rights in any way. 1 9 ILEC comments amplify these points.
The existence and potential breach of confidentiality obligations
and contractual right-to-use limitations are given particular emphasis as impediments to providing competing local exchange carrier access to and use of unbundled network elements. 120 Further,
it is proffered that a CLEC's combination of unbundled network
elements may not be covered by the ILEC's license, or perhaps may
infringe the patent of a total stranger. CLECs, it is urged, should
bear the cost of managing the resulting increase in local exchange
carriers' liability risks-through negotiation and payment for any
additional license or right-to-use-agreement that might be required-and indemnifying ILECs for any losses that result from
the failure to adequately contract to the risk.
The CLEC position remains that mere access to and use of network elements does not implicate ILEC confidentiality obligations
since no trade secret disclosure results, and ordinarily will cause
equipment providers' technology to be used only in the manner for
117. See Lucent Techs., Inc., Comments at 5, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory
Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); Northern
Telecom, Inc., Comments at 5, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15,
1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
118. See id.
119. See Lucent Techs., Inc., Comments at 2, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory
Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); Lucent
Techs., Inc., Reply Comments at 1-2, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling
(May 6, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
120. See SBC Communications, Inc., Comments at 3-13, In re MCI Petition for
Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
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which it already is permitted. More generally, the MCI petition
and CLEC comments contend that ILEC provision of network facilities access ordinarily would not implicate third party intellectual
property rights. 12 1 They argue that neither purchase nor transfer
of control of elements is entailed in the CLEC purchase of access to
and use of ILEC network elements any more than it is involved in
the purchase of ILEC subscriber services. All that is involved is
ILEC provision of access to and use of equipment providers' technology to perform for a CLEC exactly what it does for an ILEC. It
therefore is argued that infringement of equipment providers' patents and copyrights is unlikely.
The CLEC position resonates with equipment providers' emphasis of functional use, not physical control or access, as critical to
whether a new or modified license, and perhaps additional license
fees, will be necessary. ILEC retention of control in fact underlies
a general consensus that the sale of services ordinarily will not implicate manufacturers' intellectual property rights, 1 22 but may implicate contractual use restrictions. Use initiation, however, is
precisely what right-to-use contractual restrictions concern, and
equipment providers' comments make clear that access which calls
upon network elements may be regarded in some instances as use
123
which exceeds that authorized by contract.
121. See In re Petition of MCI for Declaratory Ruling at 6-7 (Mar. 11, 1997) (CC
Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPOL 97-4); MCI Reply Comments at 1-6; In re MCI
Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No.
CCBPol 97-4); AT&T, Comments at 2, 18-26, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory
Ruling (Apr. 15 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); AT&T Reply
Comments at 16-20, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC
Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4). See also Affidavit of Richard L.
Bernacchi at 11 8-11, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling at 14 (May 5,
1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4) (attachment to Comments submitted by AT&T).
122. See Lucent Techs., Inc., Reply Comments at 8, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (May 6, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4);
Northern Telecom, Inc., Comments at 6, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling
(Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); SBC Communications, Inc., Comments at 14-15, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15,
1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
123. See Belcore Communications Research, Inc., Comments at 2, In re MCI
Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No.
CCBPol 97-4); Northern Telecom, Inc., Comments at 6, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); Lucent Techs., Inc., Reply Comments at 9, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling
(May 6, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4). As a general matter,
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The CLEC analysis implicitly limits the concern primarily,
though not exclusively, to contractual right-to-use restrictions of
the kind which are the principal subject matter of UCITA. The
most obvious exception, as the plaintiff argued in DSC v. Pulse,
concerns the loading of a copy of software into volatile memory for
CLEC rather than a licensed ILEC's use. The common argument,
adopted by ILECs and suggested by equipment providers, is that
this makes a copy of a copyright-protected work which may not be
contractually or impliedly authorized by the owner of copyright. 12 4
Even this, however, is contract-based and involves the increasingly
common use of contract to leverage copyright ownership into pat125
ent-like regulation of applied or functional use.
The CLEC and ILEC positions are unchanged on the question
of who should be responsible for obtaining, and negotiating, any
new agreements that in fact may be required. Equipment providers at least appear to lack strong views on this point. One, for example, expressed readiness to assist ILEC customers in identifying
instances in which CLEC access to or use of unbundled elements
requires either ILEC negotiation of a license modification or
CLEC--or ILEC-acquisition of a new license.' 26 Neutrality also
best describes the equipment provider position on whether ILECs
or CLECs should be responsible for negotiating any new license, or
payment of any required new license fees.' 27 On the latter point,
ILECs continue to characterize the additional costs as traceable
solely to CLEC access and use, and therefore chargeable solely to
the equipment manufacture's comments adopted the view that actual use of
software rather than CLEC's physical control or "hands on" that software was the
focus of concern.
124. The point was made specifically by ILEC rather than equipment manufacturer Comments. See SBC Communications, Inc., Comments at 14-15, In re MCI

Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No.
CCBPol 97-4). Manufacturers emphasized the relationship between intellectual
property rights and contract right-to-use terms without venturing the stronger
claim that each CLEC-initiated loading of software made a copy, and therefore
presented a potential instance of computer program copyright infringement.
125.

See Nimmer, supra note 24; Rice, supra note 24.

126. See Lucent Techs., Inc., Reply Comments at 12-13, In re MCI Petition for
Declaratory Ruling (May 6, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
127. See Lucent Techs., Inc., Reply Comments at 12, In re MCI Petition for

Declaratory Ruling (May 6, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4)
(through emphasizing readiness to work with ILECS); Northern Telecom, Inc.,
Comments at 2, 8, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC

Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).

188 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:159
the CLEC. 128 CLECs, in contrast, contend that compliance with
47 U.S.C. § 251 requires that the costs be treated as network costs
to be shared among all users of the network elements on a nondis29
criminatory basis. 1
B.

Third Party IntellectualProperty Rights Not a Substantial
Factor

Intellectual property law and intellectual property rights
licenses do not present a substantial problem, at least not one of
the magnitude claimed by ILECs. This is recognized, though not
wholly conceded, in various equipment manufacturers' comments.
The focus in those comments is more on contractual use restrictions and their enforceability. This section briefly explains why
third party intellectual property rights are of limited significance.
The following section focuses primarily on the greater significance
of third party licensors' contractual restriction of computer program and electronic database copy use.
State trade secret law is of little relevance. Neither sale of retail services to a CLEC nor CLEC access to the functions performed by unbundled or vertical network elements discloses the
informational content of third party computer programs or electronic databases. Equipment manufacturers' comments on the
MCI petition acknowledge this, and deny the contrary contention
of ILECs that nondisclosure obligations will be violated by resale of
128. See Ameritech, Inc., Comments at 6, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory
Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); Bell Atlantic
and NYNEX Telephone Cos., Comments at 4, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory
Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); GTE Serv.
Corp., Comments at 7-9, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997)
(CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); SBC Communications, Inc., Comments at 16-27, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC
Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); SBC Communications, Inc., Reply Comments at 7-18, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC
Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
129. See AT&T, Comments at 10-16, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling
(Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); MCI, Reply Comments at 6-8, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket
No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); Telecommunications Resellers Ass'n, Comments
at 7-8, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No.
96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); LCI Telecom Corp., Comments at 6-10, In re MCI
Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No.
CCBPol 97-4); Sprint Corp., Comments at 6-8, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory
Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
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services or provision of access. 130 Trade secret thus serves only as
potential leverage for inclusion of an independent contract term
that expressly prohibits or restricts use by or for the benefit of a
CLEC. This is more likely to be at the behest of an ILEC than an
equipment manufacturer.
Equipment manufacturer patents presumably create a greater
potential problem for 47 U.S.C. § 251 implementation. A telecommunications equipment or software patent gives its owner the exclusive right to use or sell that which the patent claims cover, 13 1
and some case law indicates that this supports enforcement of contractual post-sale use restrictions by way of an action for patent
infringement. 1 32 Factually, however, the Milgrim analysis of numerous contracts between SBC and telecommunication equipment
manufacturers demonstrates that manufacturer patents present
little or no problem. His findings indicate that, aside from a confidentiality term, the most common contract term dealing with intellectual property rights is one which states that the manufacturer
grants no patent license to the ILEC. 1-a This strongly indicates
that ordinary use of unbundled network elements does not infringe
any patent because any use exclusively reserved to a manufacturer
by its patent would have to be licensed in order for an ILEC not to
be liable for infringement. A contract term expressly denying the
grant of any such license means that none is required, and this
makes it implausible that a CLEC would be required to secure a
patent license. A patent license is a patent owner's covenant to not
34
If
sue for use that is otherwise exclusive to the patent owner.'
ordinary use by an ILEC does not require such a license, it follows
130. Equipment manufacturers emphasized resale of ILEC services, in particular, as presenting no concern about potential disclosure of proprietary information
disclosure, and more generally indicated that continuation of ILEC physical control of software otherwise minimized any risk associated with use of unbundled
network elements. See Lucent Techs., Inc., Reply Comments at 8, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (May 6, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPo1
97-4); Northern Telecom, Inc., Comments at 8, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory
Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
131. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994).
132. See B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
133. See Affidavit of Roger M. Milgrim at 20, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling at 14 (Apr. 14, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4)
(attachment to Comments submitted by SBC Communications).
134. See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181

(1938), affd on reh g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
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that the same use by a CLEC similarly requires no shield against a
manufacturer's action for infringement.
Finally, an equipment manufacturer's copyright in a computer
program provides only limited protection against unauthorized reproduction or distribution of program copies, 13 5 and no protection
of electronic database content.' 36 Further, the protection of copyright does not extend to that which properly is the subject matter
of computer program patent or trade secret law protection. 137 In
all other respects, however, copyright subsists in every computer
program. This is what makes the ILEC position apparently
stronger in the case of copyrighted computer program components
of local exchange equipment.
Any loading of a computer program or code into a storage medium to execute an unbundled network element function reproduces the original.- 1s This technically infringes copyright unless
the copyright owner expressly or impliedly authorizes it.139 Such

authority is necessarily implied if the computer program is an integrated component of a single hardware and software product acquired in an equipment sale or lease transaction. The matter is
less clear if the computer program is provided subject to a separate
copy use license, the terms of which expressly authorize only certain uses or expressly prohibit or restrict specified uses of the copy.
It has been held that contrary use is a breach of contract, 140 and
that a copy made in the course of such use infringes the copyright. 14 ' On the other hand, the Federal Circuit in DSC v. Pulse
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (1994).
136. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(factual content wholly unprotected; compilation that meets constitutional stan-

dard of originality is entitled to limited, or "thin", copyright protection).
137. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl, Inc., 49
F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996)
(spreadsheet program menu command structure a method of operation, and there-

fore not protected by program copyright); Engineering Dynamics v. Structural
Software, Inc., 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995) (limiting copyright protection to nonfunctional elements of user interface).
138. This overstates the case in not allowing for storage that is so transient
that it cannot be said that the program was ever fixed in a tangible medium. A
defining quality of is it being at least temporarily fixed in a tangible medium. See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of "copy").
139. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
140. See National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assoc. Intl, Inc., 991 F.2d
426 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861 (1993).
141. See id.
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expressed reservations about rote application of the latter principle 1 42 and reaffirmed that copyright is not infringed merely by re-

producing a computer program in Random Access Memory (RAM)
in the course of the program's use if the program copy was not subject to a contractual use restriction when acquired.143
This brief review, DSC v. Pulse, and other underlying cases
show that more turns on the terms of the contract between the
copyright owner and the party to whom it transfers a copy rather
than on the bare existence of copyright. Some cases arguably support the ILEC position that CLEC access of unbundled network
elements that requires making a temporary copy of a computer
program supplied by an equipment manufacturer produces an unauthorized, and therefore infringing, copy. It is nevertheless clear
that a license to use a program copy to perform a network element
equipment function expressly or impliedly authorizes any necessary reproduction of that copy in RAM or other volatile memory.
Manufacturers' comments shy from the ILEC position, and in some
instances support the alternative view in stating that there is no
distinction to be drawn between use by ILECs and use of unbundled network element computer programs by CLECs.'4 Greater
emphasis in equipment manufacturers' comments on contractual
use restrictions further supports this, and identifies those restrictions, rather than intellectual property rights, as the most significant issue. The necessary implication is that the MCI and Local
Exchange Carrier Coalition petitions, and parties' definition of issues in negotiating and requesting arbitration interconnection
agreements, are misdirected.

142. See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d
1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting view that licensee cannot be the owner of a
copy for purposes of the Copyright Act in favor of focusing on particular facts in
light of, among other things, underlying reasoning of court in MAI v. Peak).
143. See id. at 1363.
144. See Northern Telecom, Inc., Comments at 5-6, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 14, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4) (so
long as direct access not involved); Lucent Techs., Inc., Comments at 2, In re MCI
Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 14, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No.
CCBPol 97-4); Lucent Techs., Inc., Reply Comments at 2, In re MCI Petition for
Declaratory Ruling (May 6, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
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C.

Price DiscriminationImplications of Equipment
Manufacturers'Comments

Equipment manufacturers' responses do not make clear
whether manufacturers intend to require new licenses, modification of existing licenses, or the payment of additional fees. What is
clear, however, is that the situation is prime for requiring additional payments. DSC v. Pulse demonstrates that telecommunications equipment manufacturers sometimes do claim substantial
rights to control use even when, in exchange for a single payment,
equipment is delivered under a contract that gives an ILEC the
right to possess and use the equipment for an indefinite term.
Market entry in a network environment, the situation with which
47 U.S.C. § 251 deals, almost uniquely presents the opportunity to
exercise this control to require new agreements and payments. 14 5
The concern expressed most directly by AT&T is that statutorily required CLEC access to unbundled network elements clearly
presents equipment manufacturers with an opportunity, and a
strong economic incentive, to demand extra compensation as a condition of granting additional or new use rights. 14 6 A primary function of contract terms that restrict the use of computer programs
and electronic databases is to differentiate customers by type, intensity, and other use criteria. 147 Inclusion of restriction-of-use
terms in contracts between ILECs and their equipment providers
as a means of distinguishing ILEC and CLEC use can be made the
basis for exacting heavy tolls for third party CLEC access and use
irrespective of whether CLEC access to the particular network elements requires equipment manufacturers to render any additional
performance, provide new equipment or use capacity, or expand
their license of intellectual property rights. 148 Indication that such
premiums might be charged was carefully avoided in equipment
manufacturers' comments, yet those comments expressed strong
145. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479, 488-90, 548-51 (1998).
146. See AT&T, Comments at 14, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling
(Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); Telecommunications
Resellers Ass'n, Comments at 6-8, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr.
15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
147. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
148. See Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination,Personal Use and Piracy:
Copyright Protectionof Digital Works, 45 Buff. L. Rev. 845 (1997); Rice, supra note
112, at 1266.
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concern that the Commission not presume to limit the enforceabil14 9
ity of restriction-of-use contract terms.
The circumstances and prospects led AT&T, in particular, to
emphasize the allocation of direct and transactions costs of equipment manufacturers' price discrimination premiums between
ILECs or CLECs as the most important issue presented by the
MCI Petition. 150 The position effectively accepts, arguendo, the
enforceability of contractual restriction-of-use terms. It further
anticipates that economically rational equipment manufacturers
will view legislatively mandated CLEC access to and use of unbundled local network elements as an opportunity to use contract
terms in the described manner to secure a greater economic return.
Since the market for telecommunications equipment is unregulated, the latter assumption is justified. The resulting focal points
therefore are reduced to the enforceability of manufacturer's restriction of use terms and the allocation of new premium charges
between CLECs and ILECs.
IV.

A.

CONTRACTUAL COPY USE RESTRICTIONS-REVISITED

Significance for Local Competition Policy Implementation

The state commission order that precipitated MCI's filing of a
petition for declaratory relief allocated to CLECs the burden of ascertaining the necessity for obtaining additional approvals, along
with the burden of negotiating and pay for them.' 5 1 Implicitly, it
also placed on CLECs the burden and cost of disputing the effect of
any contractual restriction-of-use terms contained in individual
equipment manufacturers' contracts with Southwestern Bell. The
47 U.S.C. § 251 mandate that ILECs provide access to retail services and unbundled network elements on a nondiscriminatory basis was addressed primarily by rejection of Southwestern Bell's
claim that it additionally was the responsibility of a CLEC to independently identify those manufacturers from which additional
149. See Lucent Techs., Inc., Comments at 4, 5-6, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4); Northern Telecom, Inc., Comments at 3-5, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling
(Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
150. See AT&T, Comments at 3, 10-16, In re MCI Petition for Declaratory Ruling (Apr. 15, 1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
151. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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right-to-use authorization might be required. 152 The state commission instead required that Southwestern Bell supply upon request a list of all known and necessary license and right-to-use
agreements and to use best efforts to facilitate CLEC acquisition of
153
any necessary authority.
UCITA and decisions such as ProCD v. Zeidenberg make telecommunication equipment manufacturers' contractual right-to-use
restrictions, not their intellectual property rights, the most prominent impediments to ILEC provision of CLEC access to and use of
unbundled network elements.'15 Equipment manufacturers' comments filed in response to the Commission's request for comments
on the MCI petition suggest that additional authorization will not
be required, but stop well short of stating that no existing or future
contracts will require it. The fact is that the policy and mandate
expressed in 47 U.S.C. § 251 structurally create a strong incentive
for equipment manufacturers to seek additional revenues based on
CLEC use of local network elements. Initially, the end might be
sought through interpretation of terms in existing ILEC contracts.
In the longer term, the means might shift to what might be called
clarifying modification of existing contract terms and the refraining of comparable terms in new contracts. Correspondingly, the
position taken by Regional Bell Operating Company ILECs with
respect to negotiation of 47 U.S.C. § 251 agreements strongly indicates a disposition to welcome, not bargain against, such terms.
The conditions conduce to a result based solely on common interest. Collusion is not required.
B.

Limitations on the Enforceability of Contract Terms

The enforceability of contract terms is subject to some limitations. Copyright law includes specific limitations, the most notable
152. See In re MFS Communications Co., Inc. Arbitration Award, Tex. Pub.
Util. Comm'n, Docket Nos. 16189, 16196 and 16226, slip op. at 96 (Nov. 7, 1996).

153. Id.
154. Numerous commentators remark that contractual restriction of use rivals,
and often exceeds, copyright in its scope of protection and its contemporary importance. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: FirstAmendment Constraintson Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 429-33 (1999);
Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management," 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462 (1998); Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1025 (1998); Neil W.
Netanal, Copyright in a Democratic and Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283, 382-83
(1996).
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being the rights reserved to the owner of a computer program copy
under 17 U.S.C. § 117 of the Act. 15 5 Its relevance is limited, however, to contests between the owner of copyright and one who possesses and claims to the have the rights of the owner of a copy. Its
relevance and effect was argued and considered in the trial court in
DSC v. Pulse,156 but it has little if any bearing on the issues
presented by the MCI petition.
The copyright misuse doctrine is a further limitation on the
enforceability of license terms. 1 5 7 It also has little relevance. Judicially, it is a doctrine notable for its frequent judicial recognition,
but still-evolving affirmative application.15 8 It also has little direct
relevance since it thus far is recognized only as an affirmative defense in an action for copyright infringement.' 59 Further, it might
require substantial extension of the doctrine to invalidate contractual restrictions on the use of a copyright protected work based
upon the effect of ILEC and manufacturer contract terms on a
third party CLEC.
UCITA recognizes two other limitations: unconscionability of a
contract or term' 60 and contract term violation of other public pol155. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994).
156. DSC Communications, Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 976 F. Supp.
359, 362-63 (1997), affd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed.

Cir. 1999).
157. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999);
Practice Management Info. v. American Medical Assoc., 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.
1998); Lasercomb America, Inc v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). Copyright misuse was asserted as a defense against liability for infringement in DSC v.
Pulse, but it was not considered on the merits by the Federal Circuit because the
District Court, having dismissed the copyright claims, had not considered the defense below. DSC v. Pulse, 170 F.3d at 1368. In Alcatel v. DGI the Fifth Circuit

reversed the District Court rejection of the copyright misuse defense to an action
brought by DSCs successor, Alcatel.
158. See, e.g., BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Pub'g Inc.,
933 F.2d 952, 960-61 (11th Cir. 1991) (perhaps requiring, contrary to Lasercomb,
antitrust violation in order for doctrine to apply). On the state of the copyright use
defense generally, see, G. Gervaise Davis, III., The Rapidly Growing Defense of
Copyright Misuse and Efforts to Establish Trademark Misuse 566 (1985) and Practicing Law Institute: Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property
Course Handbook Series 639 (1999).
159. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Servs.,
746 F. Supp. 320, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
160. UCITA § 111(a) states:
(a) If a court as a matter of law finds a contract or a term thereof to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of the contract without the un-
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icy. 16 1 The first limitation is of no significance in the immediate
context. Unconscionability is rarely found in a case involving a
contract between two commercial parties, and certainly not where
the term-challenging party is a substantial and sophisticated commercial entity. 16 2 It might be additionally argued that a third
party cannot meet one of the two traditional criteria in unconscio163 as opposed to "substantive" 16 4
nability analysis, "procedural"
unconscionability. UCITA itself moots this point. Legislating that
computer information contractual use restrictions are fully enforceable against third parties' 6 5 necessarily makes either procedural unconscionability, or unconscionability as a limitation,
wholly irrelevant where term enforcement is against a third party.
Since there is no statutory rule that expressly precludes a transferee from resisting enforcement of a term on the ground that it is
unconscionable, the former is more logical. 16 6 Even so, this insight
conscionable term, or limit the application of the unconscionable term so
as to avoid an unconscionable result.
161. UCITA § 105(b) states:
(b) If a term of a contract violates a fundamental public policy, the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of the contract
without the impermissible term, or limit the application of the impermissible term so as to avoid a result contrary to public policy, in each case to
the extent that the interest in enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement of the term.
162. See James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 49 (5th ed. 1999); E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 4.28 (1999).
163. "Procedural unconscionability" concerns contracting circumstances. Factually, it focuses on such matters as the relative positions and capacities of the
parties, and especially whether the person against whom enforcement is sought
was necessitous, unfairly surprised, or otherwise at significant disadvantage. See
White & Summers, supra note 162, at § 4-3; Farnsworth, supra note 162, at § 4.28.
The two-part procedural and substantive tests of unconscionability trace to Professor Arthur A. Lefts seminal article, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1967).
164. "Substantive unconscionability" concerns the nature and effect of a term
or contract. Its focus is on matters such as harshness and overreaching. See
White & Summers, supra note 162, at §§ 4-6, 4-7; Farnsworth, supra note 162, at
§ 4.28.
165. UCITA § 504(b)(1) states "The transferee is subject to all contractual use
terms."
166. It hardly can be doubted that fundamental, not waiveable limitations on
the enforceability of terms or contracts inhere in them, and cannot be laundered.
Most judges would think it disingenuous to argue that a non-contracting person
against whom UCITA statutorily makes contract terms enforceable may not challenge the enforceability of term on the ground because she really is not a contracting party. The limited point is that a person against whom UCITA makes a
term enforceable as if she was a contracting party should be entitled to assert the
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has little application in the immediate context because the contracts in question are paradigmatically commercial.
Unlike unconscionability, public policy limits on contract and
term enforceability are generally indifferent to whether a contract
is, or is not, commercial. 16 7 The sources of public policy upon
which courts draw, and which UCITA directly makes applicable,
are extrinsic. Deal or contracting facts are relevant only to the extent that they show whether conditions necessary to, or guiding
the application of, a particular ex contractu public policy are
met. 168 In contrast, procedural unconscionability looks to deal
facts in assessing the particular bargain context, and substantive
unconscionability looks to deal-specific risk allocation effects of a
challenged term or contract. 169
UCITA does not create new law by expressly making contracts
and terms which it governs subject to public policy as a limitation
on enforceability. General contract and commercial law recognize
judicial authority to invalidate a contract term or declare a contract unenforceable for reasons of public policy. 7 0 Case law, pending individual states' enactment of UCITA, establishes that Article
7
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs software contracts.' '
Inherent in applying the U.C.C. is that U.C.C. § 1-103 applies, and
opens the way to the application of extrinsic expressions of public
policy to limit the enforceability of telecommunications equipment
contracts and their terms. Similarly, general contract law estabsubstantive unconscionability of a term with respect to which enforcement is
sought as if she was a contracting party. The sophistry of the alternative, making
the term uncontestable because she had absolutely no contracting party self-protection opportunity, is self evident.
167. This is best exemplified by antitrust law which, aside from the monopoly
provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, proscribe contracts in restraint of trade. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Commercial contracts are its subject
matter.
168. Antitrust law, and particularly the Rule of Reason, most clearly exemplifies this.
169. UCITA § 111(b) states:
(b) If it is claimed or appears to the court that a contract or term thereof
may be unconscionable, the parties must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.
170. See, Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 178-79 (1981); U.C.C. § 1-103
(1995) (Supplementary General Principles of Law); Farnsworth, supra note 162, at
§ 5.1.

171. See cases cited supra notes 52 and 54.
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lishes public policy limits on the enforceability of ILEC and CLEC
unbundled network element access and sale of retail services
agreements and terms. 17 2 Affected terms clearly include those established by State agency arbitration pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(b).
Historically, the principle that a contract term that violates
173
public policy is unenforceable was a creation of the courts.
Courts have drawn upon diverse sources when determining
whether a term or contract is unenforceable for reasons of public
policy. Considered sources range from moral and social values to
economic principles and ideas.' 7 4 Recognizing that elected legislatures are increasingly prominent expostulators of public policy,
courts tend to look more to legislation and less to general norms as
the most relevant or governing expression of public policy.-7 5 Regardless, it remains exclusively for a court or other appropriate adjudicative body to determine whether and how a particular public
policy affects the enforceability of an individual contract or its
terms.
The Telecom Act strongly expresses a primary, and several
secondary, public policies. Promotion of competition in the provision of telecommunications services is the primary purpose of the
landmark legislation. 176 Secondarily, it articulates public policies
of promoting competition in the provision of local exchange carrier
services, 177 interconnection, 178 and competition in the provision of
long distance telecommunication services.' 7 9 Interstitially, it expresses a legislative judgment and policy that ILECs, and principally RBOCs, shall not be granted authority to provide interLATA
(Local Access and Transport Area) or long distance services
172. Contracts for services, as opposed to transactions in goods, are governed
by general contract law, not U.C.C. Article 2: Sale of Goods. See cases cited supra
note 53.
173. See Farnsworth, supra note 162, at § 5.1. The principle is one which, as
matter of public policy, denies the exercise of'judicial power to enforce a contract or

term which contravenes an identifiable public policy. It seeks primarily protects
the integrity of the state and its courts, and secondarily an individual against
whom enforcement is sought.
174. See id. at § 5.2.
175. See id. at § 5.5.
176. See 47 U.S.C. § 257(b) (Supp. II 1997).
177. See id. at § 251(b), (c).
178. See id. at §§ 251(a), 257(b).
179. See id. at § 257(b).
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originating from within their region until they have demonstrated
compliance with the mandate to provide CLECs with access to and
use of unbundled local exchange network elements and retail services at wholesale rates on a just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory basis.180
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PETITION OF MCI AND RECONSIDERATION
OF THE COIvMIISSION's FIRST REPORT AND ORDER
IMPLEMENTING THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

ACT OF 1996

A. ProceduralSetting and Alternatives
MCI's petition requested that the Commission issue a declaration that the Telecom Act preempts state commission arbitral imposition of a requirement that CLECs negotiate and pay for
additional equipment provider right-to-use terms. 18 1 The issue
also was raised by the Local Exchange Carrier Coalition petition
82
for Commission reconsideration of its First Report and Order
and in AT&T v. Bell Atlantic.
Procedurally, the issue is before the Commission in two styles:
as an adjudicatory and as a rulemaking matter. The first raises
both the particular issue, and issues related to interpretation of
the Commission's preemption authority under 47 U.S.C. § 253
(d).18 3 The second raises no issue concerning statutory authority 8 4 and therefore more cleanly raises the particular substantive
issue. A third means by which the issue conceivably might come
before the Commission would be in connection with a RBOC application for authority to provide in-region interLATA and long dis-

tance services. Such authority is conditioned on the RBOC being a
180. See id. at § 271.

181. See In re Petition of MCI for Declaratory Ruling (Mar. 11, 1997) (CC
Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPOL 97-4).
182. See id.
183. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) provides that "[o State or local statute or regulation,
or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. III 1997). 47 U.S.C. § 253(d) empowers
the Commission to preempt any such statute, regulation or legal requirement. See
id. at § 253(d).
184. The power of the Commission to utilize its general rulemaking powers
under Section 201(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, in carrying
out the provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was settled in the Commission's favor in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 377-86 (1999).
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party to one or more agreements by which it provides CLEC interconnection with and access to the RBOC's network facilities,185
and satisfying a lengthy checklist which includes providing nondiscriminatory access to network elements comprised of, e.g., unbundled local loop, transport, switching elements. 18 6
AT&T v. Bell Atlantic shows a fourth manner in which the issue can arise. Interconnection agreement terms established by
state commission arbitration pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252(b) are
subject to challenge in federal district court.'8 7 The reported and
unreported District Court and, more recently, Court of Appeals decisions dealing with such challenges are becoming quite numerous.
Even so, the recent Fourth Circuit decision is the only reported decision at all on-point despite the term frequently being one on
which the negotiating parties cannot reach agreement and must
submit for arbitration to date.
The fifth way in which the issue might present would be entirely outside implementation of the Telecom Act. It would be in
an equipment manufacturer lawsuit alleging ILEC breach of a
right-of-use restriction by providing CLEC access to and use of local network elements and, perhaps, CLEC inducement of breach.
Direct and contributory copyright infringement claims doubtlessly
would be asserted in any such action. The parties, relationships,
business considerations, and actual disputed uses differ from those
of DSC v. Pulse and similar cases, but occupy common ground.
Each presents basic issues about the enforceability of restrictionof-use terms, and liability for direct and contributory copyright infringement. Private litigation nevertheless differs, and its consideration as a way in which same or similar substantive issues might
be raised is beyond the scope of this article. Its focus is on how
issues that ordinarily present in private litigation bear upon administrative implementation of the Telecom Act.

185. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(cX1)(A), (2)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. III 1997). If no such interconnection has been requested, the requirement can be satisfied by filing with its
state commission a statement of terms and conditions that the RBOC generally
offers for the provision of such interconnection and network facilities access. See
id. at § 271(c)(1)(B), (2)(AXiXII).
186. See id. at § 271(2XB).
187. See id. at § 252(e)(6).
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Substantive Issues: Negotiation and Payment for New Use
Authorization

Neither the author nor telecommunications equipment manufacturers perceive any substantial likelihood that manufacturers'
patents or copyrights will be infringed, or their trade secrets
wrongfully disclosed, by ILEC sale of retail services at wholesale
rates or CLEC use of unbundled network elements. At the same
time, manufacturers insist that expanded or new contractual authorization, and perhaps accompanying payment, may be required.
Beyond this, they generally express neutrality on the questions of
whether an ILEC or CLEC must negotiate and make payment for
that authorization, or how associated financial costs should be allocated between an ILEC and a CLEC.
General indifference toward who must negotiate and pay for
any additional right-to-use authority is consistent with the view
that implementation of the Telecom Act poses little threat to intellectual property rights. It also evidences an awareness of revenueenhancement opportunities with respect to already sold or licensed
equipment and software. Yet it appears, based on the Milgrim affidavit, that confidentiality restrictions may limit ILECs' ability to
disclose to CLECs the terms of ILEC and equipment provider contracts. This suggests some difficulty for the Commission with respect to state commissions' potentially differing allocations of
responsibility to obtain additional or new right-to-use permission
and whether that responsibility should be placed on the ILEC or
CLEC. On the one hand, access to information required for negotiation by CLECs is restricted. On the other there may be little incentive for ILECs to aggressively bargain with equipment
providers concerning financial terms. Each has significant
Telecom Act implications.
Even the state commission decision most favorable to ILECs
rejected that CLECs must search in the darkness of an information
embargo to ascertain whether, and from whom, additional authority must be sought and bought.18 8 AT&T v. Bell Atlantic concurred
that this is a problem, but did deal with it directly. It seems implicitly addressed, however, by the requirement that ILECs to negotiate future contract terms to include sufficient authority for
188.

See supra text accompanying note 15.
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CLEC access, and to use best efforts to renegotiate existing
contracts.
This approach admits of several problems, the first of which is
that it does not assure acquisition of authority for CLEC interconnection and unbundled network element use. In addition, it does
not resolve the cost allocation for transaction costs and additional
fees that may result if a CLEC ultimately negotiates after an
ILEC's good faith negotiation authorization effort fails. More generally, the alternative of assigning the burden and control of negotiation to ILECs lacks appeal if one is of the view that ILECs' lack
incentive to expedite CLEC market entry. 18 9 Control over negotiation for a required additional use authority translates into substantial control over the timetable for CLEC market entry. This is
true regardless of whether CLECs are held solely responsible for
additional license or right-to-use fees or ILECs and CLECs must
share the costs on a just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory basis.
Even more obvious is that ILECs have an incentive to accede to
high cost terms if CLECs alone are responsible for payment of any
additional payments sought by opportunity-maximizing equipment
manufacturers.
State Commissions have addressed the matter in the course of
term arbitration, imposing on ILECs an affirmative obligation to
act with diligence and in good faith. They specifically have required that ILECs provide a requesting CLEC with information
sufficient to identify those telecommunications equipment manufacturers from which additional right-to-use authorization may be
required.' 90 Secondarily, they have required that ILECs act in
good faith to provide any other necessary assistance.' 9 ' Failure to
meet these or related obligations would be actionable by a CLEC as
a breach of contract where the term was part of an agreement concluded between an ILEC and a CLEC. It also would be a ground
for CLEC objection to Commission approval of an RBOC applica189.

See supra text accompanying note 13.

190. This is manifest in the Texas Public Utilities Commission requirement in
its MCI and other decisions that Southwestern Bell act in good faith and use its
best efforts to assist CLEC acquisition of required additional rights. Se Texas
Pub. Util. Comm'n, Comments at 3, In re Petition of MCI and Implementation of
the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Apr. 15,
1997) (CC Docket No. 96-98, File No. CCBPol 97-4).
191. See id.
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tion to provide either interLATA 192 or out-of-region long distance' 93 telecommunications services originating from within its
region.
It is not the author's purpose to advance a particular substantive resolution. Discussion of particulars, their potential implications, and the consequences of differing state treatment of
questions not in any way local in character nevertheless demonstrates the need for, not mere appropriateness of, for a single and
generally applicable disposition.
C. Rationale for Commission Action
More direct and generally applicable disposition by the Commission is called for by the MCI and Local Exchange Carrier Coalition petitions. Three significant policies support exercise of the
authority and means available to the Commission. First, it is the
policy of the Act to promote competition in the provision of telecommunications services, with particular emphasis on local markets in
which RBOCs have been dominant or held monopolies. The second, and implicit, is a policy that services consumers will be the
beneficiaries of price as well as services competition. The third is
that this will come about in a manner that is reasonably
expeditious.
The matter has been contested in a number of states, but the
basic issues are not local in character. Even so, state commissions'
arbitrated terms are similar in some respects and dissimilar in
others. Indeed, differing terms might be established by compulsory arbitration in neighboring states that are within the same
RBOC/ILEC region. This itself argues for a single and generally
applicable resolution. More significant is that the dispute implicates several dimensions of national telecommunications policy as
expressed in the Telecom Act. Action by the Commission, the
agency primarily responsible for implementation of the Act, is the
most obvious course. The principal question is not whether, but in
what manner and by what means, the Commission should take up
and address the recurrent issues.
192.
193.

See 47 U.S.C. § 271(bXl), ( c), (d) (Supp. I1 1997).
See id. at § 271(b)(2), (j).
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VI.

MEANS FOR COMMISSION IMPLEMENTATION OF A
POLICY CHOICE

A. Preemption Under 47 U.S. C. § 253 (d): Adjudication of the
MCI Petition
Jurisdiction to review a state-approved agreement lies with
the appropriate Federal District Court 19 4 FCC jurisdiction under
47 U.S.C. § 252 is limited to acting in the stead of a state commission that does not timely act to approve an agreement reached by
an ILEC and a CLEC or otherwise fails to carry out its responsibilities under 47 U.S.C. § 252.195 MCI's petition therefore was
brought with referenced 47 U.S.C. § 251 and invoked the Commission's authority under 47 U.S.C. § 253(d) to declare that a state or
local legal requirement that a CLEC independently negotiate licensing agreements with equipment vendors has "the effect of
prohibiting the ability of a [CLEC] ... to provide ...

interstate or

service" 196

intrastate telecommunication
and to preempt enforcement of any such legal requirement pursuant to 47 U.S.C.
19 7
§ 253(d).
Proceeding under 47 U.S.C. § 253 on an individual petition for
a declaration concerning an SGAT term upon which negotiating
parties did not agree is a legally precarious course of action for the
Commission. First, there is a question of whether an arbitrationestablished term fits the description of a "State or local statute or
regulation, or other State or local legal requirement?" Is a term
established by a state commission in its federally-mandated compulsory arbitration of disputed terms "a local legal requirement?"
Likely not. "Local requirement" seems intended to reach measures
such as local ordinances or permitting processes. 198 Terms prescribed by a state commission in its exercise of a federal statutory
power and mandate to arbitrate terms on which an ILEC and a
CLEC have not reached a negotiated agreement seem quite different. They lack the organic character of a statute, regulation, or
ordinance. Rather, they are terms of a private agreement which
194.

See id. at § 252(e)(6). State court review is expressly precluded. See id. at

§ 252(e)(4).
195. Id. at § 252(e)(5).
196. Id. at § 253(a).
197. See id. at § 253(d).
198. See, e.g., AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 928
(W.D. Tex. 1997).
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has public overtones in that negotiation and conclusion of an
agreement is statutorily mandated by the Telecom Act.
B.

Commission Exercise of Its Rulemaking Authority

Commission exercise of its general rulemaking power to adopt
regulations implementing the Telecom Act was upheld by the
Supreme Court in AT&T v. Iowa UtilitiesBoard. The record shows
that issues related to ILEC versus CLEC responsibility identifying
any need, negotiating, and paying for additional telecommunications equipment provider authorization are recurrent, not isolated.
It also has been demonstrated that the agreement term in question
has significant 1996 Act policy implications. The most prominent
relate to the substantive statutory goals of promoting competition
in the provision of telecommunications services and, in furtherance
of that end, establishing a level playing field for incumbent and
competing local exchange service providers. The less obvious include the process goals of efficiently and expeditiously transforming the telecommunications services sector from a regulated
industry to a competitive market. Dispute, and the necessity of
relying on state commission arbitration of agreement terms on a
case-by-case basis slows the process of concluding 47 U.S.C. § 252
agreements. More important, it raises the specter of state-to-state
differences concerning what the standard of just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory terms requires in the circumstances.
The potential significance of differences is substantial. Terms
set by the several states' commissions will govern, with differing
consequences, the prospective negotiation of right-to-use terms
and the amount of any attendant additional charges. State-tostate differences in arbitration-established terms, including those
which allocate the burden of negotiating additional authority as
well as those which determine who must pay any additional fees,
will establish in practice differing pricing standards. This has
been demonstrated in the discussion of how the content of negotiation responsibility, and even more so additional fee payment,
terms are shaped. 19 9
The majority in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board rejected the argument that the 47 U.S.C. § 252(c), concerning standards for arbitration, and its reservation of local services rate-setting to state
199.

See supra text accompanying notes 192 and 193.

206 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:159
commissions rendered the Commission's Total Element Long Run
Incremental Cost Pricing (TELRIC) regulations invalid. 2°° The
Court upheld the Commission's action on the ground that the Commission's authority under 47 U.S.C. § 251 gave it power to establish pricing standards and a pricing methodology that state
commissions must apply in the establishment of rates in a manner
that complies with 47 U.S.C. § 251.201
The agreement terms at issue invariably have been the subject
of state commission arbitration and establish pricing-related standards. Although different because more particular than the
TELRIC rule challenged in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, the involved terms are in fact integral to a pricing standard and methodology of general relevance and application. The recurrent need for
state commission arbitration of the term testifies to the general
relevance and application of a Commission rule addressed to the
matter. The bottom-line cost implications of the disputants' differing positions amply attest that allocation of the burdens of identifying potential need for new right-to-use authority, securing it
through negotiation, and paying any additional fees demonstrate
the need for a generally applicable standard framed with reference
to the goals and requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 251. In summary,
rulemaking is an available, appropriate and the recommended
course of action.
C. Jurisdictionand Resolution Under 47 U.S.C. § 271
RBOC application to the Commission under 47 U.S.C. § 271
for authorization to provide interLATA services originating in one
or more states within its region presents the Commission with a
last-look opportunity to consider terms on which the applicant offers competing carriers access to and use of unbundled network elements. The statutory procedure requires that the Commission
notify the Attorney General of the application in order to provide
an opportunity to submit comments and submit an evaluation of
the application "using any standard the Attorney General considers appropriate." 20 2 It also requires consultation with the state
200. 525 U.S. 366, 377-86 (1999).
201. Id.
202. 47 U.S.C. § 271(dX2) (Supp. III 1997). See the Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Justice, Application of SBC Communications, Inc. (May 16, 1997) (CC
Docket No 97-121) as an example of such a filing.
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commission in any state covered by the application. The purpose
of the latter is to verify RBOC compliance with the requirement
that it has entered into one or more agreements approved pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252, or generally offered suitable agreement
terms and conditions even though no competing carrier has requested access and interconnection, 20 3 and meets the competitive
checklist requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)2(B). 20 4 The Commission may approve an application only if the petitioner has met the
agreement requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1) and the checklist
requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 271(2)(c), and the Commission is satisfied that requested approval is consistent with the public interest,
20 5
convenience and necessity.
The 47 U.S.C. § 271 approval process appears to provide a
suitable and serviceable means for addressing issues of the kind
presented by the MCI and Local Exchange Carrier Coalition on a
case-by-case basis. Indeed, a 47 U.S.C. § 271 application is
uniquely capable of presenting the subject matter in its broad perspective because the application may seek approval to provide interLATA services originating in more than one state within an
RBOC's region. State-to-state differences in some negotiated or arbitration-established terms might be expected and generally unremarkable. Yet it has been shown that the terms in question
directly bear on whether an interconnection and access agreement
provides access to and use of network elements on terms that are
consistent with the requirements of 47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252.
Moreover, the preceding discussion of rulemaking as a potential
and recommended response is grounded in the fact that state-tostate differences in this realm significantly implicate 1996 Act policies and the potential for their fulfillment.
While suitable and serviceable, the 47 U.S.C. § 271(d) application and approval process is little better than a back-stop or failsafe rather than an efficient means for dealing with the issues
presented by MCI and the Local Exchange Carrier Coalition.
203. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1), (2)(A) (Supp. HI 1997).
204. See id. at § 271(c)(2XB).
205. See id. at § 271(d)(3). The Commission retains some supervisory authority
even after approval. Specifically, if it determines that an RBOC has ceased to be in
compliance with any conditions of approval, it may issue an order, after notice and
an opportunity for a hearing, to correct the noncompliance, impose a statutory penalty, or suspend or revoke its prior 47 U.S.C. § 271(d) approval. See id. at
§ 271(d)(6).
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Leaving so fundamental an issue for address in this late, and essentially binary choice, decision making stage is undesirable. This
is evident upon considering the procedural status that results in
the event the Commission determines that an application does not
meet the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 271. On the one hand, an
RBOC might seek judicial review of the Commission's denial by
filing an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
20 7
Circuit.2 °6 Alternatively, it might renegotiate agreement terms

and seek state commission approval of the revision. 20 8 The process
in each instance is one that introduces delay into, not expedites,
implementation of the requirements and policy objectives of the
Telecom Act. Thus, although suitable and serviceable, 47 U.S.C.
§ 271 offers a policy resolution means that is distinctly inferior to
Commission rulemaking.
D. JudicialResolution of Issue
AT&T v. Bell Atlantic and DSC v. Pulse exemplify different
ways in which the effect of intellectual property license terms and
contractual right-to-use restrictions may come before the courts
rather than the Commission. The first directly presents the issue
as one for resolution under the Telecom Act. Even so, differing outcomes may be reached in the several judicial circuits and their districts so long as the issue does not reach the Supreme Court on its
merits. 20 9 The second presents the issue as one of contract restriction enforceability or intellectual property rights infringement.
Telecom Act policy as interpreted by the Commission and the
courts in other matters will be essential background in any such
litigation, and in some cases interconnection agreement indemnifi206. See id. at § 402(b).
207. In a case where no request for interconnection and access has been made
by a competing carrier, this would require revision of SGATS. See id. at
§ 271(c)(1)(B).
208. The requirement of new state approval is not explicit in the Telecom Act,
but is implicit in the 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(2)(B) requirement that the Commission
consult with relevant state commissions to ascertain whether an RBOC which has
filed a 47 U.S.C. § 271(d) application-including a later application-had met the
interconnection and access agreement and competition checklist requirements of
47 U.S.C. § 271(c).
209. No petition for certiorari was filed in AT&T v. Bell Atlantic at the time
this article was published.
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cation terms of the kind established by the Virginia State Corporation Commission 2 10 will bring the Telecom Act into the foreground.
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in AT&T v. Bell Atlantic is
quite satisfactory in some respects, less so in others, and only a
partial response in general. A critical assumption in this capsule
appraisal is that the remand to the Virginia State Corporation
Commission does not disturb the requirement that, in future
equipment hardware and software negotiations, Bell Atlantic negotiate intellectual property license and contractual right-to-use
terms sufficient to the interconnection and network element use
requirements of AT&T, MCI and other CLECs. It is that provision
which most clearly is satisfactory. Less so is the Fourth Circuit's
holding that Bell Atlantic is required to use its best effort to renegotiate existing intellectual property license terms.
Concluding that 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) does not require Bell Atlantic to provide interconnection and access to and use of unbundled network elements free of third party claims does not meet the
statutory requirement that these be provided, let alone the requirement that they be provided on nondiscriminatory terms and
conditions. Requiring only a good faith effort to renegotiate terms
of existing agreements to expressly authorize interconnection or
access to and use of network element hardware and software falls
short of the 47 U.S.C. § 251 mandate that the incumbent local exchange carrier enter into interconnection agreements which provide for interconnection and for competitor access to and use of
those elements. Even requiring in a Virginia State Corporation
Commission arbitrated term that Bell Atlantic must in good faith
assist competing local exchange carriers in succeeding negotiations
with equipment manufactures is insufficient. 2 11 It would permit
state commission approval under 47 U.S.C. § 252 of what is
facially an interconnection agreement which does not secure
achievement of the goal of the Telecom Act: competitor entry into
the local exchange services market. This is because the terms and
conditions are not sufficient to in fact assure the availability or
210. See AT&T Communications of Va., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic-Va., 197 F.3d 663,
670 (4th Cir. 1999).
211. Necessary assistance would include, at the threshold, sharing with CLECs
information about existing licensing agreements, something which various Comments filed with the FCC and the Fourth Circuit's opinion in AT&T v. Bell Atlantic
indicated that ILECs generally refuse to or indicate that they are barred from doing by the terms of such licenses.
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provision of interconnection and access to unbundled network elements. In addition, the disposition in AT&T v. Bell Atlantic does
not address what the Fourth Circuit itself recognized to be a problem, the fact that requiring competing carriers to negotiate and directly pay for additional right-to-use authorization economically
disadvantages competing carriers vis a vis ILECs in the provision
of local exchange services. As the court stated, "the lease rate by
the [Virginia State Corporation Commission] ... already accounts

for licensing fees paid by Bell Atlantic, so any additional fees paid
by MCI to third parties would constitute double payments." 2 12 Finally, the Fourth Circuit opinion spoke only to third party intellectual property rights, not contractual right-to-use restrictions. As
shown in this article, the latter likely are more significant than
third party intellectual property rights as potential barriers to local competition policy implementation. Unfortunately, even if certiorari is sought and granted in AT&T v. Bell Atlantic, the asserted
claims and pleadings do not appear to present the Supreme Court
with an opportunity to resolve the full constellation of issues which
are only partially raised by the MCI and Local Exchange Carrier
Coalition petition and the litigated challenge to the Virginia State
Corporation Commission order. Judicial address of the array of issues and their implications thus must await their full presentation
by an affected party in another case.
The second way in which the issues might reach the courts is
in an action brought by an equipment and software provider action
against a CLEC or an ILEC. In contrast to DSC v. Pulse, an infringement action brought against a competitor, the claims would
be against a user or customer. An action against a CLEC most
likely would be for infringement of copyright or other intellectual
property rights. The essence of the claim is that use of a network
element involved making a copy of software or using network elements that was not authorized by the terms of an ILEC's license.
Assuming the ILEC license is governed by UCITA, assertion of a
contract-based claim is possible in at least some circumstances on
the ground that UCITA makes license terms enforceable against
third parties. As previously discussed, proceeding against a CLEC
in contract is tenuous. On the other hand, contract would be the
principal basis for an action against an ILEC which permitted
212.

See AT&T, 197 F.3d 663, 670.
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CLEC access to and use of the subject matter in violation of the
manufacturer's contractual right-to-use restrictions. Ancillary
claims for direct or contributory infringement of intellectual property rights also might be advanced in such an action.
The close relationship of any such action to Telecom Act implementation is emphasized by the fact that an action against either a
CLEC or an ILEC might lead to assertion by one against the other
of a right to indemnification under an interconnection agreement
indemnification term. However, neither type of case is likely to
present in full the issues directly and indirectly raised by the MCI
and the Local Exchange Carrier Coalition petitions, or by an appropriately framed challenge to arbitrated terms contained in an
interconnection agreement approved by a state commission. It is,
in any event, beyond the scope of this article to extensively consider this type of litigation as a different means by which discussed
Telecom Act issues might present. Even so, two brief comments
directly related to matters are warranted. The first is that assertion of direct or contributory copyright infringement claims in the
described manner may invite again judicial reassessment of the
rule and implications of MAI v. Peak.2 13 The second is that any
contract claims that might asserted implicate public policy as expressed in the Telecom Act. In that respect, the terms for which
enforcement are sought epitomize those which invite the UCITA
section 105(b) or general contract law defense that they are unenforceable because their enforcement would violate extra-contractual public policy.
VII.

OBSERVATIONS ON CONTRACT AND LIMITATIONS THEREON

Noticeably absent from the above discussion is an explicit
mention of public policy, the copyright misuse doctrine, or other
principles as limitations on the. enforceability of equipment manufacturers' contractual restrictions of the use of their software or
equipment. This reflects a conclusion that nothing in the Telecom
Act or the Communications Act of 1934 vests the Commission with
legal authority to express itself on the enforceability of terms of a
particular manufacturer and ILEC contract. What the Commission
213. It should be recalled here that the Federal Circuit in DSC v. Pulse and the
Fifth Circuit in Alcatel v. DGI expressed an unwillingness to fully embrace MA! v.
Peak.
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does have authority to address is the allocation between an ILEC
and a CLEC of the transaction costs incurred in negotiating additional right-to-use authority and the price that must be paid to acquire that authority.
Still, the underlying purpose of the article is to address the
market effects of enforcing right-to-use restrictions in contracts for
the distribution of computer program and other electronic information product copies. It considers the effects of a general public policy favoring the enforceability of bargains within a statutory
framework in which promotion of competition and the formation of
facilitating agreements are other public policy expressions of the
first order. It has been demonstrated that one effect of judicial and
state legislative validation of vendor use of contract to lever the
existence of intellectual property rights is to promote use of contract to erect barriers against primary line competition and to
price discriminate. DSC v. Pulse and Alcatel v. DGI exemplify the
former. The much mooted decision in ProCD v. Zeidenberg exemplifies the latter on facts which demonstrate that, without aid of
contractual use restrictions, it is difficult to make an informational
work or computer program widely available for general use at a
price that is affordable and simultaneously charge a higher price to
those who acquire the product for commercial use. The MCI and
Local Exchange Carrier Coalition petitions deal with use restrictions in a quite different setting, and consequently bring out a different mix of effects. While they pertain to equipment provider, or
UCITA "licensor," potential use of contractual use restrictions to
price discriminate, it also involves ILEC, or UCITA "licensee," interjection of contractual right-to-use restrictions in an attempt to
secure competitive advantage. The circumstances are atypical, if
not unique, but strongly suggest that UCITA has unintended and
unconsidered consequences particularly in network environments.
In this instance, the contract terms which UCITA would enforce
not only conflict with the policy objective of promoting local telecommunications service and price competition. They also create a
prospect that the existence of use restricting terms and the need to
account for them in the implementation of the Telecom Act will
lead to an increase in costs to local service subscribers rather than
full realization of an expected reduction brought about by a change
from regulated to competitive markets.
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The preceding observation suggests that network environments, and perhaps especially those subject to some-albeit decreasing-degree of regulation are ones in which the effects, and
enforcement of contract terms generally made enforceable by
UCITA and judicial decisions such as ProCD v. Zeidenberg contravene section 105 (b) of UCITA. It provides that a court may refuse
to enforce a contract, or a particular term, if it determines that a
contract term violates a fundamental public policy. In the immediate context, it might be argued that use restriction enforcement as
a means to increase the price of otherwise ordinary use under the
terms of an original contract clearly violates strong public policy
favoring competition as generally expressed in antitrust law and
more importantly, specifically expressed in the Telecom Act. The
clear implication is that the term should not be enforced to the extent that it is a means to that end. 2 14 Arguably, this course of ac-

tion may be beyond the authority of the Commission under 47
U.S.C. § 253(d) to preempt the enforcement of a state "statute, regulation, or legal requirement to the extent necessary to correct
such violation or inconsistency" it determines to exist between the
state law and the prohibition in 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) against state or
local law prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any intrastate telecommunications service. The issue was not raised in the
first instance in AT&T v. Bell Atlantic, and therefore is not clearly
presented even if the case eventually comes before the Supreme
Court. It remains a question for future consideration and determination by a court with appropriate jurisdiction.
VIII.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The MCI and Local Exchange Carrier Coalition petitions and
the AT&T v. Bell Atlantic decision show how legal discourse, argument, and disposition concerning information technology conflate
intellectual property and contract rights. Factually, the contractual right-to-use restrictions are the most significant source of potential concern is the 47 U.S.C. §§ 251 and 252 context.
Nominally, most of the parties and involved decision makers mischaracterize the subject matter for debate as intellectual property
rather than contract rights. Jurisprudentially, this proceeds
214. UCITA § 105(b) permits a court to limit the enforceability of a term rather

than forcing a bi-polar choice between enforcement and nonenforcement.
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from-and demands further-misdirected analysis. The result is
to over-extend property law principles in some instances 2 15 and
contract rules in others,2 16 and distort established rules of both in
the course of justifying why they produce a result that truly apposite principles might or might not prescribe. 21 7 More generally,
each is a legal manifestation of an information era conflict. This
conflict is between those who depend upon a mix of intellectual
property rights and contract terms to strengthen control over the
distribution of information as a product or commodity, and those
2 18
who perceive that this mix excessively restrains competition
and regresses product users from being free to being serfs. 2 19
The circumstance calls for federal rather than individual state
commission determination of how to deal with third party intellectual property and, more usually, contract rights in interconnection
agreements. The issue involves the proper interpretation of the
Telecom Act and it has been raised in numerous states. Although
the issue was first put to the Commission, it subsequently has been
considered and addressed in part by Fourth Circuit in AT&T v.
Bell Atlantic. Even if that decision is reviewed by the Supreme
Court, there likely will be much left for the Commission to consider. All dimensions of the issue were not put before or expounded upon by the Fourth Circuit. More importantly, the
parties defined and the Fourth Circuit dealt with the dispute as
one concerned exclusively with third party intellectual property
rights and rarely-or only secondarily-with related contractual
215. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 154; Nimmer, supra note 24. The consequences of comparable conflation of property and tort are trenchantly illuminated
by Judge Alex Kozinski in Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., No 96-55243, 1999 WL 1256287
(9th Cir. Dec. 28, 1999).
216. See Jessica Littman, The Tales That Article 2B Tells, 13 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 931, 937-38 (1988); Rice, supra note 24.
217. The author's premise is that efficiency and fairness considerations still
guide thoughtful and reasoning jurists. The suggestion is that a judge presented
with a property issue cloaked in contract terms, or a contract issue cloaked in property terms, may seek the solution of the other body of law by recasting rules of the
argued law rather than seeing and stating "Counsel ... let's talk about the right
stuff."
218. See David McGowan, Free Contracting,Fair Competition, and Article 2B:
Some Reflections on Federal Competition Policy, Information Transactions and
"AggressiveNeutrality," 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1173 (1998); Rice, supra note 112.
219. The insight is that of Thomas M.S. Hemns in Restrains on Alienation, Equitable Servitude, and the Feudal Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71
Deny. U. L. Rev. 577 (1994).

1999]

TELECOMMUNICATION ACT OF 1996

right-to-use or restriction-of-use terms. Further, existing differences among states and the frequency with which lower federal
courts differ on other often-presented interconnection agreement
issues creates a likelihood of continuing state-to-state differences
until such time as they are addressed by the Supreme Court or
dealt with by the Commission.
The Commission has adequate legal authority to more completely address the matter, and the preferred means is through the
Commission's exercise of its general rulemaking power. Fundamental differences between rulemaking and adjudication make the
agency less dependent than the courts on how parties define the
issues. This provides the Commission with an opportunity to initiate more careful differentiation between third party intellectual
property and contract rights as appropriate. In contrast, proceeding by adjudication based on the MCI petition would limit the latitude of the Commission to insist upon greater attention to this
difference. Finally, its legal authority to preempt specific terms
prescribed by state commission arbitration is suspect. In summary, any effort to address the issues should be through rulemaking, not adjudication.
It would be an interesting venture to more deeply explore
whether public policy expressed in the Telecom Act itself limits the
enforceability of telecommunications equipment manufacturers'
right-to-use restrictions. Acatel v. DGI and DSC v. Pulse already
indicate that the copyright misuse defense may significantly limit
the use of contract to lever copyright into a patent-like shield
against competitor access to, and the use of software elements of,
electronic switch and other telecommunications network equipment. UCITA, in contrast, makes such contractual right-to-use restrictions enforceable against third parties, including CLECs, as
well as against an equipment manufacturer's competitors. The circumstance invites future investigation of other article-related
questions. These include whether state enforcement pursuant to
UCITA or other contract law may be preempted by the Telecom Act
rather than, as more commonly mooted, 17 U.S.C. § 301 of the
Copyright Act. 220 A second is whether section 105(b) of UCITA,

and its more limited declaration that a contract term which violates recognized public policy is not enforceable, independently
220. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
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makes terms of the kind discussed in this article unenforceable as
a matter of state contract law. Alas, neither question can be adequately addressed within the scope of this article.

